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Abstract
The research on methods for conflict resolution and prevention has improved dras-
tically in the last years. In particular computer-aided methods have acquired more
importance because they allow for larger databases with more variables, complex
statistical analysis, deeper insights etc... This thesis intends to give a description of
those methods and projects that I consider most interesting and/or representative in
the field, with the goal of pointing out some questions and problems which need still
to be answered. Moreover two new methods, never used before for conflict situation,
are also presented: Multicriteria-Clustering and Logic Functions.
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Introduction
In the last years the research on methods for conflict resolution and prevention has
improved drastically. In particular computer-aided methods have acquired more
importance because they allow for larger databases with more variables, complex
statistical analysis, deeper insights etc... When the initial skepticism on the use of
automated systems in the conflict field partially dissolved (mainly due to political
science analysts), it begun the debate on what the best method would be (qualitative
or quantitative, and within quantitative what kind of methods). This debate is still
alive but analysts have recently acknowledged that the best solution most likely de-
rives from a combination of methods. Even if great progresses have been made in the
field, the incredible number of different approaches that use different conflict theories
and work with different and not always comparable data, have brought often to the
construction of fragile models with poor forecasting performance or with no political
relevance. In fact, both internal and external conflicts (over country boundaries)
are characterized by complex phenomena whose interactions are often non linear
and non monotonic: the problem of finding causal and predictive stable relations
between variables and concrete predictions is thus hard even when using reliable
methods. It is thus crucial to know which are the results and the methods used by
other researchers in order not to make useless work. In fact, being the field of conflict
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analysis relatively a new one and given that the world situation is changing rapidly
over time, there is the risk that a research project become old in a brief amount
of time. In the literature, there are previous example of systematic analysis that
help researchers in understanding current developments and results: for instance,
the book of Trappl et al. (2006) is a collection of recent articles by scientists from all
over the world that study specifically the application of computer-aided methods for
international conflict resolution and prevention, Schrodt (2004)’s survey is instead
the result of more than a decade of research in the field of computational modeling
of international politics and presents “..a set of formal approaches for studying the
regularities of international political behavior. It is theoretically based in studies of
human cognition and organizational information processing; it is methodologically
based in computational modeling”.
This thesis would like to be a systematic study of the methods present in the litera-
ture. It doesn’t pretend to be a survey of all the projects and methods that can be
found in the literature, but instead it intends to give a description of those I consider
most interesting and/or representative, with the goal of pointing out some questions
and problems which need still to be answered. Moreover two new methods, never
used before for conflict situation, are also present. As I will show in the following,
my work has been limited from the datasets available for tuning and testing them
and thus, even if they present interesting results, they still need further work and
testing.
The structure of the thesis is as follow:
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Chapter 1: An introduction to Conflict Analysis
The nature of conflict is changed drastically from the past, especially since the Cold
War. In this chapter an introduction to the new types of conflict the world is facing
is presented. Security related problems have given rise to new branches of research:
scientists have begun to focus on the possibility of making reliable predictions in order
to avoid the explosion of violent conflicts. In this chapter an initial description of the
lines of research called risk assessment and early warning are given. The alternatives
quantitative vs qualitative, and structural vs dynamical methods are discussed. Some
important international projects on risk assessment and early warning are described
(FAST, CIFP, FEWER).
FAST improves the ability of decision makers to identify critical developments so that
political strategies can be formulated for preventing or limiting the effects of violent
conflicts. It combines annual reports deriving from field investigation, weekly event
data analysis, daily qualitative analysis, constant monitoring and external expertise.
CIFP identifies and assemble statistical information underlying the key-feature of the
political, economic, social and cultural environment of countries in the world. Both
FAST and CISP are partners of FEWER, a global coalition of non-governmental and
governmental agencies and academic institutions working to promote co-ordinated
responses to violent conflict.
Chapter 2: Causal Models
One of the needs of the research community is the study of models that allow to
thoroughly understand the causal relations among the different variables that char-
acterize the situations of potential conflict: these models are called Causal Models.
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Computer simulation, one of the most widely used Operations Research (OR) tech-
niques, could be an important instrument for the analysis of a complex dynamic
system such as the conflict, both for a quantitative and a qualitative analysis of the
situation. In this chapter I will describe four existing models based on computer
simulation. The first model is due to Wils et al. (1998). Starting from a theory
developed by Choucri and North (1975), the authors present a system dynamics1
model which relates the conflict to factors affecting the possibility of sustainable
development such as population growth, resources and technology. Considering the
type of variable used, which change rather slowly over time, this model can highlight
situations of possible instability, but can hardly be used to anticipate the outbreak
of a violent conflict. It can be used to analyze both, inter-state and infra-state con-
flicts. Secondly I will describe a model developed by MIT researchers that study
the dynamics of the possible causes of the instability of a state, in particular those
related to anti-regime communications. The state is seen as having a capacity for
limiting the loads generated by anti-regime activities. If some particular conditions
(including several threats to the state) occur, then small changes can bring to the
collapse of the system. The aim is to find these particular conditions (to be used for
instance to test social theories) and to try to make some predictions of when critical
points can occur. The third model is due to Gurr (1994) and focusses on infra-state
conflicts, namely on conflicts involving minority groups within a state. Although
this does not appear to be the original intention of Gurr, it is interesting to note
that his model maps in an almost one-to-one way into a system dynamics model,
and in fact, after presenting my qualitative attempt of traducing Gurr’s theory in
system dynamics, I will also compare it to a fourth model, the Ethnic Terrorism
1see Appendix D
0.0. CONTENTS 13
Model (ETM) of Akcam and Asal (2005), that considers the theoretical aspects of
ethnonationalist terrorism (a part of Gurr’s project) for understanding, through sys-
tem dynamics, how the variables defining the conflict change over time. Finally a
discussion on the capability of these models to be used for political purposes is per-
formed and on the possibility of using computer simulation techniques together with
other methods.
Chapter 3: Conflict phases through Hidden Markov chains and Cluster
analysis
In the case that a conflict is already going on, it is also fundamental to know which is
the current Conflict Phase. According to several study on conflict theory, a conflict
can in fact be seen as a sequence of phases that form a cycle, and knowing the char-
acterization of these cycles one may try to make predictions on the ongoing conflicts.
Different authors name and describe these phases differently. One example, shown in
figure 1, is the following2: No conflict, Latent conflict : the potential of conflict exists
whenever different needs, values and interests are present. Emergence: a triggering
event can lead to the emergence (or beginning) of a conflict. Escalation: the emer-
gence can be followed by a settlement or a resolution, but also by an escalation of the
conflict. (Hurting) Stalemate: the escalation may lead to a stalemate, a situation
in which neither side can win. De-Escalation/Negotiation: an “hurting stalemate”,
where both the parties are in pain continuing the conflict, can be an opportunity for
negotiation and a potential settlement. Settlement/Resolution. Post-Conflict Peace-
building and Reconciliation: if and when an agreement is reached, peacebuilding
2http://www.caii.com/CAIIStaff/Dashboard GIROAdminCAIIStaff/
Dashboard CAIIAdminDatabase/resources/ghai/understanding.htm
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Figure 1: Phases of a conflict
efforts are needed for reconciling former opponents. Another example is given by
Alker, Gurr, and Rupesinghe (Alker et al. (2001)) that instead distinguish between
six phases: dispute (equivalent to conflict emergence); crisis (equivalent to escala-
tion); limited violence; massive violence; abatement (equivalent to de-escalation);
settlement. These phases are similar to those set out by the Complex Emergency
Response and Transition Initiative (CERTI) project3: conflict; crisis; chaos; complex
emergency; recovery. The Health as a Bridge for Peace (HBP) project4 defines five
phases: impending crisis, outbreak of violence, war, post-crisis, stable peace.
All of these models are idealized, but they might be useful. In fact most conflicts pass
through similar phases at least once in their history, so they can be used “..to develop
an early warning capability that provides reliable estimates of conflict potential; gen-
erates “warnings” months in advance of serious escalation; and enables analysts to
differentiate among different types of conflict”(Schmalberger and Alker, 2001). After
a deeper description of this kind of qualitative analyses of the conflict cycle, two ex-
isting approaches for a quantitative analysis of the conflict phases are also presented
3http://www.certi.org/
4http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/hbp/en/index.html
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and discussed. The first one, which has been proposed by Schrodt (2000a), is based
on the theory of Markov chains, or what is called Hidden Markov Models (HMM). In
these models, the states of the chain (that correspond to the diverse conflict phases)
are not directly observed; they are rather inferred from the presence or absence of
a given sequence of symbols. HMM is often used in speech recognition, compari-
son of protein sequences, in modeling the control of cellular phone networks ecc...,
all cases in which the sequences to be compared are noisy, that is, contain missing,
erroneous and extraneous elements: for this reason it seems to be appropriate for
a complex field like the conflict one. The second, proposed by Schrodt and Gerner
(1996), is quite different and is based on a single criteria clustering technique. The
algorithm proposed uses the correlation between dyadic behaviors at two points in
time to identify clusters of political activity. The basic assumption in this study is
that within each conflict phase there is a relative stability of the interactions among
the different actors, while sudden changes happens in the transition from one phase
to the next. The transition to a new cluster occurs when a point is much closer in
distance to subsequent points than to preceding points. The objective of their study
is to detect those critical patterns of event flows which characterized the transitions
from one phase to another and that can be used as an early warning indicator.
Chapter 4: Conflict phases through Multicriteria
Along with the debate between quantitative and qualitative methods, another one
between structural and dynamic data have to be taken into account. It is true that
in order to make predictions event data are usually considered more suited for early
warning purposes since they make possible the monitoring of the evolution of the
situation in the field almost day by day, but, for a correct interpretation of them,
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structural variables describing the context of the countries under study should also be
used. This is one of the reasons for which I claim that Multicriteria techniques(MC),
“..one of the most well known branches of decision making..”(Triantaphyllou, 2000),
may find fruitful applications in the conflict analysis. In fact, Multicriteria methods
can deal simultaneously with a large number of alternatives, a large number of criteria
(often conflicting) and a wide range of data (qualitative, quantitative, fuzzy, linguistic
parameters), combining assessment methods with judgment methods. According to
my best knowledge, no prior application of MC in the conflict analysis exists. In
this chapter a brief introduction to Multicriteria techniques is given. I show that
Multicriteria clustering algorithms are more appropriate and promising in conflict
analysis than the single criterion ones so far used. This is done by the use of an
algorithm due to Smet and Guzma´n (2004), who applied it in the field of financial
risk assessment. The algorithm is based on one of the most known algorithm among
clustering methods: the k-means algorithm (MacQueen (1967)). The distance which
helps classifying alternatives in the correct cluster has the characteristic of being
written in multicriteria terms. In the chapter, the algorithm, as originally proposed
by Smet and Guzma´n (2004), is described. Given some alternatives evaluated on
some criteria, the aim is to put them in the correct cluster. One of the advantage
of this method is that it has the premises for being used both for early warning
purposes and for risk assessment. The alternatives in the two cases are in fact:
a point in time describing the situation of a particular country, where the criteria
consist mainly in event data collected daily or weekly or monthly (but also in
structural information), the clusters represent the conflict phases of a conflict
and the analysis is restricted to one country in a limited amount of time with
the aim of giving insights in the short term;
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a country as being described mainly by structural data (but also by event data),
where the criteria are the ones that are deemed relevant with respect to the risk
level evaluation: literacy index, income per capita etc.., the clusters represent
the level of risk in which a country can be classified, the analysis is about a
list of countries with the aim of giving insights in the long term on their level
of risk.
Some considerations on the dynamic aspects of the data have also been added, es-
pecially for the first case: here the temporal nature of the data assume great im-
portance, it is in fact crucial to know for instance if two violent actions happen in
a country in a time span of a week or 2 years apart one from the other, while in
the original algorithm each observation in time is considered in itself as a point in
a multidimensional space, without reference in time scale. This fact, that may lead
to a misinterpretation of the data, is addressed through smoothing techniques. The
application of the MCC-algorithm on real data from the Nepal internal conflict is
discussed and some final remarks and future research lines are presented.
Chapter 5: Risk Assessment
It is also of interest to understand whether the country under analysis is a country
at risk or not, and if it is at risk, which kind of risk (low, serious, state failure...).
In this chapter I will address some approaches related to this problem, that I will call
of Risk Assessment. Risk Assessments models have different objectives from Conflict
phases models because the data used, event data for the latter and structural data
for the former, differentiate the capability of making predictions: in Risk Assessment
analysis, the aim is not to make short term dynamic insights but indeed to find where
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and how to act in order to prevent the outbreak of a crisis or to correctly intervene
with the right type of mediation or negotiation.
I will look at some of the principal existing projects and methods in the field: the
State Failure Task Project that involves statistical methods for studying those coun-
tries at risk of political instability, the use of Machine Learning like neural networks
for Military Interstate Disputes (MIDs), decision trees and rule learning for conflict
analysis and for negotiation purposes. On each method an analysis of the perfor-
mance will be discussed.
Chapter 6: Risk Assessment through Logic Function
In the Risk assessment field I can think of applying a learning method based on
Logic function in which logic separation formulas are extrapolated in an automatic
way from logic data. Logic separation formulas are sets of logic variables that,
when verified for a certain record of the dataset, allow to classify it in the correct
class. The Logic formulas are extracted from the dataset in an automatic way by
Lsquare (Truemper, 1999) that is a particular type of learning system that operates
in logic domain. Lsquare is freely distributed and has been developed in collaboration
between the Istituto di Analisi dei Sistemi ed Informatica of Consiglio Nazionale delle
Ricerche(IASI-CNR) and the University of Texas and is described in detail in Felici
et al. (2004), and Truemper (2004). According to my best knowledge, Lsquare and,
more in general, Logic Functions, have not been applied to the conflict field but they
have been successfully used for different purposes like medical ones, financial ones
etc.., and it has reached an high accuracy while finding those relations between the
variables to be used for concrete purposes. In conflict analysis this aspect can be
fundamental, in fact logic classification formulas, other than the simple classification,
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can also be used for providing new insights on the data, like the identification of the
variables that are really interesting for controlling a country at risk, or for verifying
some theoretical assumptions. In this chapter I will provide a description of the
existing method based on Logic Functions and then I will describe some preliminary
results of the application of the method to the dataset obtained from Russett and
Oneal (2001a). The results are still too poor for considering the method as being
useful for the purpose, but I will try to analyze its possible drawbacks and advantages
in the conclusion of the chapter.
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Chapter 1
An introduction to Conflict
Analysis
1.1 Introduction
The nature of conflict has assumed a different meaning from the past, especially
since the end of Cold War (see www.certi.org). The wars of the past two decades
have been largely internal ones, fed by regional politics and with cross-border impli-
cations. If we look at Africa for example, over thirty conflicts have taken place in
the past three decades causing tens of millions of people to leave their homes and
causing millions of deaths. At the basis of these conflicts there have not been always
contrasts between major political entities, but often the accumulation of hostility and
aggression within states, societies, and civilizations for ethnic, economic, religious,
or caste/class reasons. But Africa is not the only case: the majority of the world’s
low-income countries are engaged in lasting conflicts, or transitory conflicts or share
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the border with a country in conflict. (see figure 1.1 and 1.2).
The research community is thus paying more and more attention to security related
problems because of their growing importance as a global challenge during the last
years. Political, demographic, social, and even climatic economic evolutions have
given life to new threats, more diverse, less visible and more technologically sophis-
ticated than those faced in the past.
In the next future we will have to deal with always less stable regions and it is
thus necessary to adopt a more coordinated approach to ensure that a high level of
security is established across this new, more diverse territory. There is a great need
of instruments to deal with the threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, failed states, regional conflicts and organized crime.
In such a situation it appears essential that attention and research be directed, rather
than to the development of more sophisticate defense technologies, to gaining a better
understanding of the root reasons of such new threats, and to the development of
effective tools for conflict analysis and prevention. A goal which is particularly
important for the research in this area is the capability for anticipating the explosion
of violent conflicts several months before they occur in order to effectively plan and
implement appropriate conflict prevention and peace building activities.
1.2 Risk Assessment
The line of research that study the roots of conflicts is called Risk Assessment. This
analysis has the aim of understanding the mechanisms that bring to an eruption
of violence in existing conflicts in order to find where and how to act in situation
1.2. RISK ASSESSMENT 23
Conflictbarometer 2005 - Global Conflict Panorama 1
Global Conflict Panorama
Global Development
In 2005, there are 249 political conflicts. Two of
them are wars and 22 are severe crises, making a
total of 24 conflicts being carried out with a
massive amount of violence. 74 conflicts are 
classified as crises, meaning violence is used only 
occasionally. In contrast, there are 151 non-
violent conflicts, which can be differentiated in 86 
manifest and 65 latent conflicts.
Compared to last year, the number of conflicts
carried out on the highest intensity level has
slightly decreased from three to two wars. These
two, the conflict in Sudan´s Darfur region [=> 
Sudan (Darfur)] and the war between the Iraqi 
Interim Government and predominantly Sunni 
insurgents [=> Iraq (insurgents)], had already been 
carried out on the same level of intensity in the 
previous year. Last year´s third war, in the DR 
Congo [=> DR Congo (various rebel groups)], 
deescalated to a severe crisis. The number of
severe crises has decreased significantly from 35 to 
22, reflecting a significant reduction of conflicts
on the two highest intensity levels. In 2005, 24 
high-intensity conflicts are counted, compared to 
38 in 2004. The number of crises, representing 
conflicts of medium intensity, has increased
strikingly from 50 to 74. On the one hand, this 
increase signifies the trend of deescalation since
the majority of last year´s severe crises deescalated 
by one level. On the other hand, this development 
is due to the escalation of some formerly non-
violent conflicts to 
a violent level and eleven new conflicts turning 
violent in the very year of their beginning. The
number of conflicts on the non-violent intensity 
levels has decreased by three, from 154 to 151. 
While manifest conflicts have risen from 71 to 86, 
latent conflicts were reduced from 83 to 65. The
total number of conflicts has risen from 242 to 
249, as six conflicts ended in 2004 and 13 new
conflicts emerged in 2005. These are set as
follows: In Europe, two conflicts ended in 2004 
and one new conflict emerged in 2005. In Africa,
no conflict ended in 2004, one is considered to 
have ended in 2005 so far, as the territorial 
dispute between Niger and Benin was determined 
by a decision of the International Court of Justice 
in The Hague. Five new conflicts occurred in 
Africa. In the Americas, one conflict ended in 
2004 and three new ones arose in 2005; in Asia 
and Oceania, two ended and four are new; in the 
Middle East and Maghreb, one ended and no new
ones emerged. Out of the 13 new conflicts, only 
two are being carried out without violence: 
Gambia vs. Senegal and Colombia vs. Venezuela. 
Eleven are fought on a low level of violence: 
France (rioters), Guinea (assassination attempt), 
Ethiopia (opposition), Ethiopia (Oromo - 
Somali), Sudan (Eastern Front), Belize 
(opposition), Colombia (Guambianos),
Bangladesh (JMP), India (Meghalaya) and
Uzbekistan (opposition). In order to show a long-
term trend, the five intensity levels are categorized 
into three groups: the two non-violent levels are 
summarized as low intensity, crises as medium 
intensity, and severe crises and wars as conflicts of
high intensity. The graph 
(a) Ongoing global Conflicts of low, medium and high intensity 1945 to 2005
(http://www.hiik.de/)
(b) Levels of conflict intensity
Figure 1.1: Conflict Intensity
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below also presents the total number of conflicts
observed. As shown by the graph, the number of
annually observed conflicts has more or less
continuously risen from 74 in 1945 to 249 in 
2005. Most conflicts are low-intensity conflicts.
When looking at high-intensity conflicts, a
continuous and for the most part regular increase 
is obvious, from seven in 1945 to 38 in 2004. So 
the latest development of a decrease to 24 high-
intensity conflicts in 2005 is quite remarkable. 
Three phases of high escalations can be 
distinguished: 1945 to 1949 from seven to 20, 
1976 to 1979 from 22 to 37 and 1989 to 1991, 
the period that saw the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, from 31 to 47 marking the overall peak of
high-intensity conflicts. Comparing the graphs of
high- and medium-intensity conflicts, a
diametrical trend is notable in the rise and fall of
the curves.|*|When the number of high-intensity 
conflicts increases, there is a decline in medium-
intensity conflicts or crises respectively. This
signifies that deescalating high-intensity conflicts
often remain on a violent level, while crises often 
escalated to high-intensity conflicts. In many
cases, individual conflicts oscillate between the 
level of a crisis and a severe crises or war.     
Analysis intrastate - interstate
In 2005, a total number of 178 internal and 71 
interstate conflicts have been counted. None of
the two wars and 22 severe crises has taken place 
between states, all of them being intrastate.
This represents a most remarkable finding. After 
all, in only three interstate conflicts (Armenia - 
Azerbaijan, Nigeria - Cameroon, Bangladesh - 
India) violence has been used occasionally by the 
opposing parties. This was the case in 71 internal 
disputes. On the intensity level of manifest
conflicts, the number of intrastate conflicts has
also been considerably higher than that of
international conflicts, with 52 to 34. Solely in 
matters of latent conflicts, interstate ones
outweigh those within states by four.
The long-term analysis, for which the two high 
intensity levels, severe crisis and war, have been 
summarized into one group, shows clearly that the 
predominance of intrastate violent conflicts can be 
observed from the beginning of the examined 
period.    
Regional Development
The Americas are the region with the least total 
number of conflicts, 24. With a total of 86 out of
249, almost a third of all conflicts are located in 
Asia and Oceania. With 79, the region has also
the highest number of low- and medium-intensity 
conflicts. In terms of crises, Asia and Oceania with 
28 is followed by Africa with six crises less, third is 
Europe with half the number of Africa.
Remarkably, Europe is the third in terms of the 
total number of conflicts, but has with only one 
severe crises [=>Russia (Chechnya)] the least 
number of high-intensity conflicts. Unlike 
previous years, with eight most high-intensity 
conflicts having been fought out in the Middle 
East and Maghreb, Asia and Oceania ranks second
with seven high-intensity conflicts, Africa is third 
with five. This is just the inverse order as in the 
last 
Figure 1.2: Ongoing intra- and interstate Conflicts of high Intensity 1945 to 2005
(http://www.hiik.de/)
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of instability. It usually takes into account those factors like ethnic and linguistic
heterogeneity, income inequality, environmental stresses1, that is to those factors
that can represent the pre-conditions of a crisis, that vary slowly over time and
that are strictly connected with the context of the country under study: they are
called structural factors. One of the goal of risk assessment is to develop models to be
used to identify countries at greater risk of political instability and to give insights on
how to correctly intervene with the right type of mediation or negotiation. Given the
nature of the factors studied, no short term predictions on explosions of violence or
conflicts are found with risk assessment methods but they can be used for preceding
and complementing an analysis whose aim is indeed of making prediction (see section
below). In fact, since assessments identify background and intervening conditions
that establish the risk for potential crisis and conflict, they provide a framework for
interpreting the results of real-time monitoring.
1.3 Early Warning
The line of research that regard the capability of making prediction about the explo-
sions of violent conflicts goes under the name of Early Warning, defined2 as “..the
systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the
purpose of:
• anticipating the escalation of violent conflict
1The role of environmental stress as a cause of conflicts has recently been bought to the fore by
a certain number of researchers; among the works done in the area I mention here the seminal book
of Homer-Dixon (1999).
2www.fewer.org
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• developing of strategic responses to these crises
• presenting options to critical actors (national, regional, and international) for
the purposes of decision-making and preventive action”
The process of Early Warning involves a deep analysis of existing social conflicts, with
the objective of calculating the likelihood that certain events may lead to violence or
other crises and of studying the impact of those variables that change rapidly over
time. This analysis takes into account a great variety of events like border crises,
disintegrating regimes, civil wars, genocides, human rights abuses, refugee flows, or-
ganized crime...etc, it thus regards those factors, like for example basic changes in
political relationships, that accelerate and trigger off a crisis: they are called dynamic
factors. Its importance stems from the assumption that a conflict in an early stage
can be contained by non-military interventions (diplomacy, threat of sanctions, eco-
nomic incentives, ...), or by deploying limited peacekeeping forces. These approaches
work usually on datasets composed of what are called event data. They are machine
coded data extracted from international sources like for instance the international
press agencies. Among the various techniques correlated with early warning that uti-
lize them there are the data mining techniques. As an example are the Paris in Los
Angeles(PARIS)3 and the CEWS Projects (Alker et al. (2001)). Moreover, Kovar
et al. (2000) have implemented and extended a data mining algorithm of Mannila
and Toivonen (1996) that allows to find frequent episodes and thus interesting rules
from the KEDS4 database (Schrodt et al. (1994)). A brief description of the structure
of the data and of the extraction process is given in Appendix B. The data collected
in the process are thus utilized not only to estimate where conflicts are likely to
3http://www.usc.edu/dept/ancntr/Paris-in-LA/
4http://www.ku.edu/ keds
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emerge, but also to pick new opportunities to contribute to their resolution. This
kind of analysis is very difficult to be developed, due to the thousands of different
aspects present in a single country or in a single crisis. If we want to monitor the
dynamics of a potential conflict, how shall we identify the associated indicators? A
single crisis can have multiple causes, and among these, some can assume more im-
portance than others. There can be variables that reinforce each other and variables
that in some circumstances neutralize one another. Furthermore, the choice of the
indicators depends on the type of event we would like to receive warning about.
1.4 Quantitative and qualitative methods
The early warning techniques used for analyzing such complex situations, as the risk
assessment ones, are divided in two subclasses: quantitative and qualitative. There
is an old battle to decide which of the two approaches is better. The qualitative
analysis is based on the subjective assessment of the expert and is thus vulnerable
to the biases and errors of the analyst. However there are situations in which such
subjective assessment is vital, especially for early warning purposes. In fact, it is not
always possible to capture all events which will bring the country to a crisis. There
are, in some situations, underlying phenomena that can be discovered as critical
only thanks to indigenous analysts, who base their insights only on their personal
judgement. This is especially true in countries poorly covered by the international
press. On the other side, quantitative approaches allow for an automated analysis,
which is more speedy, more consistent and more transparent than the qualitative
one. In the following I will look only at quantitative techniques and I will not enter
in details regarding the qualitative analysis, something which is beyond the scope of
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this work, although it is important to remark that both techniques are fundamental
for the early warning process. Actually, one can think of a mixed approach in which
quantitative techniques are used to highlight the regions of higher risk, and thereafter
the analysis carried out by experts is used for a fine-grained assessment of the risk.
There are several projects based on a mix of the two approaches and in the following,
as an example, I will briefly describe three of them: FAST (which uses a quantitative
and qualitative methods for early warning purposes) and CIFP (for risk assessment
purposes) FEWER (for both risk assessment and early warning).
1.4.1 FAST
FAST (German acronym of early analysis of tensions and fact-finding) is a political
early warning project launched in the 1998 by the Swiss Peace Foundation. The ob-
jective of the FAST project is ”...early recognition of impeding or potential crisis sit-
uations in order to act early and prevent violent conflict (see www.swisspeace.ch)...”
FAST uses multiple methods based on qualitative approaches, for maintaining a
context-specific understanding of the countries, and on quantitative ones for analyz-
ing the huge flow of information while reducing its complexity. The project covers
25 countries/regions in Africa, Europe and Asia.
An overview of FAST methodology is shown in figure 1.3.
FAST relies on a daily monitoring of second hand sources (in print or on the In-
ternet) as well as newswire analysis. Daily monitoring is complemented with weekly
event-data analysis that is done prevalently automated. The FAST project in fact
focus on event data analysis5: the data are extracted from some sources, they are
5Event data used by FAST is coded based on a method originally developed by Virtual Research
Associates(VRA), a Harvard-based group of academic analysts. See appendix B.
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Figure 1.3: FAST: Methodological overview (http://www.swisspeace.org/fast)
coded and then analyzed aggregating the events on a weekly or monthly basis so
that a picture of the conflict potential or country stability or patterns of cooperation
between actors can be drawn. The core products of FAST are country risk profiles
that include an annual baseline study and frequent updates in the form of regular
(quarterly, every three months) brief risk assessment. Once a year these profiles
present a deep analysis of the situation in the target countries. For each country
the key indicator groups for the purpose of constant monitoring are identified (see
figure 1.4): they represent root causes (or background factors), proximate causes,
and intervening factors. The latter set of indicators is divided by their importance
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on increasing or decreasing conflict escalation. As FAST target countries are not all
in pre-conflict situations, intervening factors take on different roles depending on the
conflict cycle. In pre-conflict/ post-conflict countries, intervening factors measure the
likelihood of armed conflict escalation while in in-conflict situation, intervening fac-
tors track indicators that either increase or decrease the likelihood for peace-building.
In all cases, however, intervening factors are not simply geared at negative factors
that can lead to warning of situation worsening, but also to windows of opportunity
for positive developments (signals of hope).
Figure 1.4: FAST Analytical framework: developed to identify and categorize causes
and issues of conflict for each target country (http://www.swisspeace.org/fast)
The early warning indicators used in the FAST project (but also in other interna-
tional projects) are mainly built from the event data extracted automatically from
international sources like Reuters, but in the last years FAST has tested a different
approach with better results. For each country/region monitored, a group of local
experts (FAST Local Information Networks (LIN)) follow the influx of information
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independent from the western media coverage, often poor for certain countries and
certain situations (external expertise). The information thus collected are then quan-
tified and translated in graphs that describe the evolutions of key early warning in-
dicators. LINs provide much more detailed information than computer-parsed event
data, in fact they provide area-specific information, constant up-to-date information
monitoring, specific and targeted information as requested from the users.
1.4.2 CIFP
Another project that uses both quantitative and qualitative approaches is the CIFP
one6. The analysis discovers situations in which certain conditions for a particular
conflict are present; the main focus is on Risk Assessment but also on the develop-
ment of a template for consolidating risk assessment and early warning methodologies
into an integrated system. The work of CIFP has the aim of enabling policy makers to
identify factors that can generate conflict while rapidly assessing policy responses to
a critical situation. CIFP collect international data gathered from statistical sources
and it identifies statistical information on the economic, social and cultural aspects
of the countries of the world. In particular, for each country it provides a set of data
regarding: demography, economics, military capability, political climate and inter-
nal stability, risk and conflict potential, social development, human security and the
environment. The CIFP database include over one hundred performance indicators
for 196 countries (for the years 1985-2004).
6Country Indicators of Foreign Policy is a project initiated by the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade (DFAIT) in partnership with the Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs at Carleton University, in Ottawa (www.carleton.ca/cifp/)
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1.4.3 FEWER
The definition of Early Warning given previously derived from Fewer 7 which is the
Forum on Early Warning and Early Response. Initiated in 1997, in 2004 it evolved
in Fewer-international (see www.fewer-international.org). It is an organization sup-
porting conflict prevention efforts with a specific focus on intra-state conflict. It is
involved in developing a series of new mechanisms, procedures and tools, appropri-
ate to the prevention, containment, mitigation, and resolution of violent intra-state
conflicts. According to the research conducted by the FEWER network members, in
order to reach effective early warning capabilities, the use of a range of data sources
and analytical methods is required: local analysis engaged in country monitoring,
newswire monitoring analysis (events data) and structural data analysis. The struc-
ture of Fewer early warning system is shown in figure 1.5.
The projects FAST and CIFP were both among the partners of FEWER. CIFP
worked on a pilot project in partnership with the Forum on Early Warning and Early
Response until 2004. The pilot project was intended to establish a framework for
communications, information gathering and sharing, and operational coordination
and to work towards a “Good Practice” conflict early warning system involving the
various members of the FEWER network.
Within the system, CIFP had the role of providing structural data and to perform
analyses on conflict and peace generating factors. These analyses emerged from
an assessment of various models of conflict analysis that have been developed by
key actors in the field of conflict prevention and early warning, including FEWER,
7www.fewer.org
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FAST, UNDP8, the Clingendael Institute9 and CIDCM (Center for International
Development and Conflict Management). On the other side, FAST focused on field-
based systematic data collection, conflict monitoring and analysis on selected regions
of the world for a real time perspective on the flows of events. FAST is currently a
membership of FEWER-Eurasia, a project that was set up in 2004 as a non-profit
foundation in Moscow and that analyses the situation on North Caucasus, Georgia
and Eastern Siberia. The regional and international expert group had instead the
role of assessing the importance of the different indicators and to understand the
problems of the main stakeholders.
8UNDP is the United Nations Development Programme: see http://www.undp.org/
9Clingendael Institute, or Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, is an
independent institute of knowledge which studies various aspects of International Relations. see
http://www.clingendael.nl/
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FAST/VRA
(News-Wire Monitoring Analysis)
(e.g Reuters, BBC)
Product: Monthly news/
summaries,/graphic analyses
Dynamic Exchange:
(FASTLocal analyst/CIFP)
Structural data/
surveying/analysis:
(CIFP/NPSIA)
Product: biannual data/survey/
graphic analysis
Local analysis engaged in
 country monitoring
Using early warning
methodology and range of
information and data
sources
Product:
Final Early warning reports
FEWER network
research activities
Products:
who is doing what and 
preventive
instruments surveys
(Russian, US 
government, EU, 
local NGOs
Regional and 
international
expert group
Role:
Feedback on early 
warning reports
Strategic roundtables
(Policy planning)
Figure 1.5: Early Warning System: Emergency Good Practice
Chapter 2
Causal Models
2.1 The dynamics of conflicts through analytical
models
The study of conflicts and of their dynamics is now a wide multidisciplinary research
area, with a large body of literature and with many specialized journals. Although
most of the approaches to conflict analysis one can find in literature of the inter-
national studies remain at qualitative level, the use of analytical and quantitative
models is not rare, in some cases highly formalized and with a certain degree of
mathematical sophistication. There are models, representing general frameworks,
which can be applied to the analysis and representation of any particular conflict (or
at least of large classes of conflicts), in order to determine who are the actors really
involved in the conflict or affected by it (the stakeholders), and to fully understand
all the elements which define the conflict (interests, needs, ...) and their interactions.
36 CHAPTER 2. CAUSAL MODELS
These models present typically a low level of formalization and bear many similari-
ties with some techniques for problem structuring developed within the Operations
Research (OR) area (Rosenhead and Mingers, 2002). Here our interest is on other
types of quantitative models, whose main goal is the study of the effects on conflicts
(their origin and their dynamic behavior) of single elements (arms, technology, re-
sources, environment, economic development, ethnic and cultural differences, ...) or
of subsets of such elements. These models often bear a strong resemblance to the
kind of models developed in the economics theory area. Possibly the first attempt
to approach the analysis of conflicts via mathematical tools is due to the British
mathematician L. F. Richardson, in the years between World War I and World War
II. In a book published after his death, Richardson (1960) analyzes the dynamics of
the arms race by means of a model based on differential equations. It is interesting
to note that Richardson’s model has something in common with another model de-
veloped about at the same time: the well known Volterra equations. In his model
the Italian mathematician Volterra (1926a,b) studied a particular conflict situation
in which there are two populations, one of predators and one of preys sharing the
same habitat.
Richardson model has more historical relevance rather than a practical one: his
model for the first time shows analytically how the desire to be more secure may
lead to an increase in insecurity and eventually to war. The study of analytical
models of conflicts has grown after World War II within the new born area of peace
studies. One can find many examples of such models in specialized journals of the
area, among them particularly relevant is the Journal of Conflict Resolution. Worth
mentioning are the attempts to build a systematic analytical theory of conflict, due
to Rapoport (1960), Isard and Smith (1982) and Isard (1992). Isard and Smith
present not only analytical models but also practical procedures (algorithms) for the
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management and resolution of conflicts.
2.1.1 Computer simulation and system dynamics
During the years, computer simulation, one of the most widely used OR techniques,
has proved to be a technique that can give a substantial contribution to conflict
analysis. In the following I will take into account a computer simulation modeling
technique called System dynamics. Forrester (1961), which is considered as the sys-
tem dynamics founder, in a recent article has defined it as “...a professional field that
deals with the complexity of systems. System dynamics is the necessary foundation
underlying effective thinking about systems. System dynamics deals with how things
change through time, which covers most of what most people find important. System
dynamics involves interpreting real life systems into computer simulation models that
allow one to see how the structure and decision-making policies in a system create
its behavior.”(Forrester, 1999).
It also stated that “...System dynamics combines the theory, methods, and philos-
ophy needed to analyze the behavior of systems in not only management, but also
in environmental change, politics, economic behavior, medicine, engineering, and
other fields. System dynamics provides a common foundation that can be applied
wherever we want to understand and influence how things change through time.
The system dynamics process starts from a problem to be solved, a situation that
needs to be better understood, or an undesirable behavior that is to be corrected or
avoided. The first step is to tap the wealth of information that people possess in
their heads.[. . . ]System dynamics uses concepts drawn from the field of feedback con-
trol to organize available information into computer simulation models. (Forrester,
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1991)” Since 1961, system dynamics has grown extensively and its application can
be found in: corporate planning and policy design, public management and policy,
biological and medical modeling, energy and the environment, theory development
in the natural and social sciences, dynamic decision making, complex nonlinear dy-
namics. It has been used to address practically every sort of feedback system where
“[...]feedback refers to the situation of X affecting Y and Y in turn affecting X per-
haps through a chain of causes and effects. One cannot study the link between X and
Y and, independently, the link between Y and X and predict how the system will
behave. Only the study of the whole system as a feedback system will lead to correct
results (from www.systemdynamics.org/)”. What makes system dynamics different
from other approaches that study complex systems is indeed the use of feedback
loops, stocks and flows (see Appendix D) because these elements allow to describe
how even simple systems may display nonlinearities.
2.1.2 Quantitative vs Qualitative analysis in system dynam-
ics
We have already seen how the relative merits of quantitative and of qualitative
models is a matter of discussion among the researchers in early warning process.
Even in the field of system dynamics the discussions about the two approaches is
still open. If we think at the basic concept of system dynamics, it might seem
quite natural to model the dynamics of a complex system by means of quantitative
variables but in the reality it is not: Forrester (1961) in 1961 stated: “In the proper
formulation of a system dynamics model the model variables should correspond to
those in the system being represented...Sufficiently close correspondence of model and
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real-system variables is obtained [by carefully ensuring that] the decision functions
represent the concepts, social pressure and sources of information that control the
actual decisions”. There are cases with uncertainties in concepts, pressures and
decisions, can be difficult or even prevent even from building a quantitative model.
In such cases it might be the case to restrict the analysis to a qualitative level, that
is, to use “non-simulation” typer of System Dynamics approach in which insights are
provided inferring rather than calculating the behavior of the system over time. (see
the model of Hosler et al. (1977) built for describing the collapse of the Maya). In
Coyle (1985) it is shown that a qualitative analysis can be useful not less than a full-
scale quantitative modelling approach. That is true for those problems characterized
by a high level of uncertainty. Typical is the case of the Health Care Sector (Coyle
(1984)), which is often full of uncertainty because of the need to deal with human
beings and their frailties in the context of medical diagnosis. In such a situation
an inference diagram can be enough to provide useful suggestions and insights to
decision makers.
2.1.3 Modelling process
We have to bear clearly in mind that the problems we are going to study are very
complex and that any model is a simplification of the reality and is intended only as
a tool to be used for a better understanding of the reality itself and to help the deci-
sion makers. Hence in any modelling process it is very important to make clear the
limits of the model we are building. The process of modelling using system dynamics
is very flexible, in the sense that there is not a fixed procedure or fixed rules: the
researchers can build a model in different ways, based on their modelling experience.
For Coyle (1998) the essence of System Dynamics is to start and finish with inference
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diagrams and to design several diagrams of the same problem for different purposes.
Essentially the study starts with the understanding of client’s concerns and mental
models about the system. Then, after collecting more information, a more deeper
study is done. This is a critical point because it might show the impossibility of
building a quantitative model so that the analysis that follows have to continue only
at a qualitative level; while, if a quantitative model is justified, then levels, rates and
auxiliaries should be identified (for the system dynamics notation I refer to Sterman
(2000)). System dynamics has already been used for modelling defence problems:
starting from Hacket’s Third World War scenario (Hacket (1978)), Coyle (1981) has
built a System Dynamics model and has shown its use by testing different strategic
options or force balances. I will not enter in detail, but there are interesting aspects
in this study that could be useful for future works: the type of model built can be
utilized also for describing other scenarios simply changing the initial conditions, and
the small number of equations (few hundreds) allow to run the model on a computer
in a very small amount of time, unlike large simulation models which require large
running time on big computers.
2.2 Lateral Pressure model
Even if there is an extensive literature on the causes of war and conditions of peace,
yet there is no agreement on why countries go to war, why violence occurs or how
internal or external conflicts might be interconnected giving rise to common dynam-
ics. The model of Wils et al. (1998) that I will present in the following, tries to
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answer these questions based on the Lateral Pressure theory of Choucri and North
(1975). The theory identifies three master variables, (P)opulation, (T)echnology and
(R)esources, and argues that the interactive effects among them can redefine the na-
tional profiles of states and that, under certain conditions, can generate pressures
that bring to an expansion outside national boundaries and that can possibly lead
to competition, international conflict and violence. Their interaction gives rise to
what is called Lateral Pressure, which can be seen as an accumulation of domestic
strains leading to an expansion over the boundaries. The theory was first formulated
by Choucri and North (1972) and applied in 1975 to the 45 years that led to the first
World War, then it was applied by Ashley (1980) to the analysis of the Sino-Soviet-
American situation in the 25 years of the post-war period. The basic causal structure
of the original theory is shown in figure 2.1. This figure shows that the three master
variables’ joint interaction can generate lateral pressure, which in turn produces be-
haviors bringing to action-reaction spiraling, or bargaining, or leverage etc... From
these processes, violent conflict or/and peaceful options like trade may emerge: in
the first case, a loop that leads to expansions and conflict is reinforced while in the
second one, a loop that mitigates the dangerous influences is reinforced.
The construction and the analysis of the lateral pressure system dynamics model has
the aim of
• relating internal sources of pressure to external activities
• specifying intervening processes that mediate between internal pressures and
external conflict
• defining the impacts of behavior that lead to external conflict
• understanding the implications of external conflict on internal conflicts.
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Figure 2.1: lateral pressure hypothesis (1972)
For doing this, in addition to the original master variables, other factors like interven-
ing behavioral variables (as propensities for external behavior, trade, military activ-
ity) and outcome variables (as internal and external conflict indices) are inserted. In
order to take into account both situations in which internal tensions bring to external
conflict or internal conflict, another important concept, which were not present in
the original theory, has been introduced: the Internal Tension. It describes those
pressures that are not “exported” over the country boundaries but serve to motivate
internal insurgencies. The formulation of internal tension, expressed, like the lateral
pressure, in terms of the master variables, derives from the studies of Cohen Co-
hen (1984) and Boserup Boserup (1968) and from Kamiya (1997). Mathematically,
both lateral pressure (LP) and internal tension (IT) are written as functions of the
three master variables. The LP value can be considered as an increasing function of
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population (P) and technology (T), and a decreasing function of resources (R):
LP = f(
T · P
R
) (2.1)
The IT function describes those pressures that can increase internal tensions and
bring to internal conflicts:
IT = g(
P
R
· 1
T
) (2.2)
For a given quantity of accessible resources, an high density of population needs an
high level of technology to have an internally stable society while a low density of
population requires only a low level of technology.
The authors have chosen the square root function for both LP and IT because it is
simple, robust and it is a concave function: this need derives from the fact that each
unit of population or technology or resource contributes to the variation of LP and IT
with less impact when the numbers increases (diminishing marginal contributions).
Take for instance the function LP . Its practical meaning, beyond its mathematical
expression, is that if the level of population and technology is high as opposed to a
low level of resource, then there can rise the need for the state of expanding beyond
its national boundaries, which can lead to violence and conflicts.
The model has been tested on 13 countries at different level of development and in
different geographical areas. A simulation from 1960 to 2050 has been carried on;
the available data, from 1950 to 1990, have been used to calibrate the model. From
the behavioral models thus built, it is possible to describe the dynamics relations
among the variables, and the causal chains and the feedback loops involved.
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The model of Wils et al. (1998) is shown in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: lateral pressure model
In the model there are five stock variables, which describe the status of the system,
the corresponding flow variables, which are representatives of the activities ongoing
on the system and a certain number of auxiliary variables and constants. The stock
variables are: lateral pressure, internal tension, population, technology and military
force. The military force is expressed in term of the military expenditure which
is a percentage of the GDP. Since it is really difficult to operationalize a complex
variable such as technology the authors have decided to use the GDP (Gross Domestic
Product) or PPP (Purchasing Power Parity: a measure of GDP adapted for local
prices). The flow variables are for instance population growth, the change in time of
the lateral pressure. . . .
2.2. LATERAL PRESSURE MODEL 45
2.2.1 Adaptation
In practice the effect of the master variables, P,T and R on LP and IP is more
complex than it appears from (2.1) and (2.2). In fact, in addition to the effect of
such variables in increasing or decreasing the level of LP and IT, there is also a
phenomenon of adaptation which may have the effect of smoothing changes in LP
and IP: the lateral pressure, as described only through the constellation of the master
variables, should follow the trend of the population. In the reality, sudden changes
increasing the level of lateral pressure may not bring immediate eruption of violence:
there is a form of adaptation of the society which takes into account old stresses
and that can reduce the potential of a conflict. This phenomenon is represented by
means of two variables that the authors have called LP drain and IT drain.
As a consequence, the variations of the stock lateral pressure variable (LP) over time
has the following form:
LP (t+ 1)− LP (t) = LPchange(t)− LPdrain(t) (2.3)
with
LPchange(t) =
√
P ∗ √T√
R
(2.4)
LPdrain(t) =
LP (t)
25
+ Internationalpotential(t) (2.5)
Where the LP change(t) is the lateral pressure variation as a function of only P,
T and R and represents the accumulation of pressure over time, while LP drain
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represents the adaptation effect. The first term of LPdrain(t) is the adaptation
term that regards those loads of pressure that are not yet ingested at time t (the
time necessary to adapt is taken as 25, one generation). The second term represents
the potential of International conflict at time t1.
The same can be said for internal tension.
IT (t+ 1)− IT (t) = ITchange(t)− ITdrain(t) (2.6)
ITchange(t) =
√
P√
T ∗ √R (2.7)
ITdrain(t) =
IT (t)
25
+Domesticpotential(t) (2.8)
IT (t+ 1)− IT (t) = ITchange(t)− ITdrain(t) (2.9)
Where the IT change(t) is the internal tension variation as a function of only P, T and
R and represents the accumulation of tension over time, while IT drain represents
the adaptation effect.
2.2.2 Instability: an example
The graph of figure 2.3 is the result of a simulation on Rwanda data and describe
the adaptation mechanism for internal stresses. Rwanda has experienced domestic
1Being function of several terms, see Wils et al. (1998) for a complete definition of International
potential(t)
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Figure 2.3: The adaptation mechanism for internal stresses
conflict in the early 1960 (in 1961 the Mouvement de´mocratique re´publicain toppled
the monarchy of the Tutsis) and a genocide in 1994 against the ethnic group of Tutsis
in which more than 800,000 people were killed. In the graph, consistently with the
historical data, multiple eruptions of domestic conflict due to high values of internal
tensions are discovered. The simulation shows that a situation that has its base in
the constellation of master variables (given by the red line internal tension change)
rarely avoid the continuum of a conflict. In one simulation the authors have instantly
switched the population growth to zero. This has immediate reduced internal tension
change but, given that the actual internal tension is the accumulation of decades, the
tensions decrease slowly. Therefore, even at a less frequent rate, conflict continues.
Internal tension drain is the factor that produce instability. The reason for the insta-
bility derives from some feedback loops concerning internal pressures: for instance,
when IT(t) rises, the first term of IT drain(t), IT (t)
25
(adaptation term), rises as well
and the same does IT drain(t). But IT drain(t) is negatively correlated with IT(t+1)
so that a negative balancing loop is formed that decreases the value of tension at
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time t+1. At the same time, the augmentation of IT(t), causes an augmentation of
Potential of domestic conflict and so for the domestic conflict (potential of domestic
conflict and domestic conflict forms a reinforcing loop), which causes a decrease of
IT(t+1), thus forming another balancing loop (see figure 2.4). The internal feedback
mechanisms of adaptation can decrease the potential of conflict but, at the same
time, violence can increase the risk of continued violence: there is a negative feed-
back between adaptation and pressure, a negative one between conflict and pressure,
a reinforcing feedback between conflict and the potential of conflict. The concept of
adaptation introduced by the authors is indeed critical. When studying this model I
thought that It is true that an augmentation of pressure (internal or external) doesn’t
bring always conflicts, but if a sudden big conflict occurs (as a genocide), does the
adaptation false the model or not?
Figure 2.4: feedback loops between internal tension and factors related with internal
tension
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2.2.3 Lateral Pressure-Internal Tension
The insertion of the IT has been an important addition to the lateral pressure theory
because the nature of nowadays conflicts is such that the epicenter of violence is often
inside the country. Again, as for the adaptation mechanism, some questions arise:
unfortunately due to the way the function have been implemented, there is almost no
relation between IT and LP. It seems that internal conflicts are never correlated with
international conflicts: this may not be the case, especially in these years where acts
of what is called terrorism may explode internally and externally, converting internal
tension in external tensions. For instance, a great part of the model is dedicated
to the military aspects: how this aspect influence the decision of the population on
expanding over their boundaries? And in which way? Why is there no connection
between military force and internal tension? The population may feel oppressed or is
in fact oppressed by the government; this link is not implemented and it seems that
it could be crucial in some situation. After having deeply understood the meaning
of the two core functions, it would be necessary to introduce a connection between
them and between military force and the factors related with internal pressures. A
possible solution can be to split the IT function in two: one could be designed as
influenced by a certain number of external factors like the trade and bargain leverage
which is about trade and commercial negotiations, and the other as a factor that
influence the lateral pressure (the connection do not need to be direct).
2.2.4 Internal and external world
One of the crucial steps in building a model is the choice of the system boundaries,
that is the decision about which variables are endogenous to our model and which are
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exogenous. Endogenous variables are those which are affected by other components
of the system, so that their dynamic behaviour is explained by causal chains and
loops internal to the model. Exogenous variables are those which affect our system
but are independent of its dynamic. In the lateral pressure model, LP is one of the
endogenous variables while the population growth rate is an exogenous variable. If
too restricted boundaries have been chosen then there is the risk to miss important
feedback loops and hence the capability of the model to capture the relevant aspects
of the system’s behaviour may be hindered. And the lateral pressure model seems to
suffer from this limit. In fact, if, for example, the number of resources decreases over
the years, or if some environmental problem occurs (affecting the variable R), then
the lateral pressure can increase but it could be not enough for a good description
of the country situation. As an example, instability in a country might cause a flow
of displaced people seeking refuge (some of them possibly armed) and hence might
have relevant effects on the neighboring countries. That is something that cannot
be explained in terms of master variables only. If we want to make the model more
useful and more widely applicable, there is the need of studying not just a country
but a system of neighboring countries: for doing that, there should be inserted more
“bridge” variables, that is, more variables that can create contact points between
the neighboring countries. In this way, if a country experience a new phenomenon
that can affect also a neighboring country, then a feedback mechanism can help
understanding the effect of this phenomenon.
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2.2.5 Regime type and Gini coefficient
Some improvement has been done by Oner et al. (2001)2 introducing some variables
relating to more structural information. For example, a new variable called regime
type is introduced. It is not so easy to define the regime type because it is often
associated with the level of democracy which is a rather elusive concept. It affects
both lateral pressure and internal tension. In fact, “many researchers have shown
that democracies virtually never go to war against other democracies, a generalization
confirmed by two centuries of experience” (Oneal et al., 1996) and “as the proportion
of democracies in the international system increases, the number of interstate system
members engaged in war decrease” (Crescenzi and Enterline, 1999). At the same
time, democracy within a state is clearly required for “the equitable distribution of
economic values, equal access to the policy making process, equal and high level of
human rights between citizens” (Oner et al., 2001, p. 6). It is not explained how
this variable has been operationalized, it seems like the authors have taken into
account the annual assessments of state of freedom, done by a non-governmental
organization, Freedomhouse, which assign to each country and territory the status
of “free” “partly free” or “not free” by averaging their political rights and civil
liberties ratings. Another important factor that can create internal pressure is income
inequality. Dependent on the level of inequality, a country may in fact experience
several social fluctuations that can explode in domestic conflict. This variable is
correlated with internal tension and not with lateral pressure and it is operationalized
2The model described by Oner et al. is essentially the same as the one by Wills et al., with some
adjustment and some additions. The model has been tested on the case of the relations of Turkey
and its neighbors. I will not describe every single change, which can be found in the paper.
52 CHAPTER 2. CAUSAL MODELS
through the Gini coefficient3. This statistical measure, between [0,1], associates a
value of 1 to situation of great inequality (one person has all the income and the
rest have none) and a value of 0 for perfect equality (all people have equal shares of
income).
2.3 Modelling state stability
Recently, in 2005, some researchers from MIT have worked in collaboration with De-
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in order to study the dynamics
that can bring to the collapse and instability of a state (Choucri et al. (2005)). The
idea of the authors is to use a system dynamic approach for understanding both the
sources and consequences of stability, and also to analyze potential ways for reduc-
ing, managing or mitigating eventual disruptions. Firstly, they have chosen some key
features from several sources of social sciences and they have built a general diagram
of the processes involved in state stability. The key system features of the general
model are shown in the causal loop diagram of figure 2.5.
The level of stability of a state may change over time and can became instabil-
ity depending on the value of the external or internal pressures. In the diagram,
state stability is related to socio-political mobilization, institutional development,
economic performance, ethnic violence and other issues that have to do with the
resilience of the states and their capabilities, and also with the pressures upon the
state and the threats to its stability.
3The Gini coefficient is defined as a measure of dispersion within a group of values, calculated as
the average difference between every pair of values divided by two times the average of the sample.
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Figure 1: High-Level Diagram of State Stability. (Circled section signals the 
segments for detailed system dynamics modeling) 
 
Figure 1 presents the High-Level Diagram of overall state stability. We seek here only to 
define broadly the overall domain as well as the SDM model focus (encompassed within 
the dashed lines).   In this diagram, the arrows show causal relationships between 
variables.  A plus sign (+) indicates that a change in the first variable (at the tail of the 
arrow) causes a change in the second variable (at the head of the arrow) in the same 
directions.  A minus sign (-) indicates that a change in the first variable causes a change 
in the second variable in the opposite directions.   A path that begins at any variable and 
traces from arrow to arrow to returns to the original variable forms a feedback loop. 
 
In many cases, there were large bodies of literature that described each of the key 
relationships.  Framed thus, we sought only to reflect some of the most dominant sets of 
relationships reflected in the literature, by way of developing an integrated device for 
representing the complexities of underlying dynamics. 
 
3.3 Drilling Deeper  
 
In Figure 1, the dotted line delineates several elements in the High-Level Diagram.  that 
we chose as the place to start the modeling process.  Choosing to analyze these sets of 
systems also yielded three other important benefits.  First, we sought to determine how 
system dynamics could best be applied to capturing and understanding state stability.  
Analysis of system dynamics is strongest when applied to situations where long-term 
Figure 2.5: The loop diagram of the stability model
The dotted lines delimited the part of the model that has been studied by the authors:
the part containing the “[...] dynamics of dissident and insurgent recruiting given
the resilience of the state and its capacity o manage a ti-regim activities[...]”. The
starting point of the model is the “recruiting”: the aim is to understand the sources
and consequences of this process, looking at the limitation given by the regime and
at the extent to which the state is capable of managing anti-regime activities. They
have chosen to limit the model considering, of all the possible actions available to the
insurgents to undermine the state stability, only anti-regime communications. The
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Figure 2.6: The insurgent recruiting model
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insurgent recruiting model, which contain about 140 equations, is shown in figure 2.6.
The population is divided in three stocks because the general population can become
dissident and then insurgent (loads) according to the behavior of the regime. One
of the critical factor in insurgents expansion is the resilience of the state (capacity)
which is written in terms of 4 terms:
Economic performance: when the economy is doing well the likelihood of an in-
dividual becoming a dissident or an insurgent becomes much smaller, while if
the economy goes not so well then anti-regime message are more likely to be
captured by the population;
Regime legitimacy: when the regime is perceived as having increased legitimacy,
the likelihood of an individual becoming a dissident or an insurgent becomes
smaller;
Political capacity : if there are strong political institutions, a corrupt regime may
still find support in the short-run;
Social capacity: as there are high inequalities within a society, instability is likely
to occur.
In figure 2.7 it is shown the effect of regime resilience on recruitment.
If the regime resilience increases, also the effect of the regime resilience on recruit-
ment increase. The greater this last effect, the larger the propensity to recruitment
is and so is the likelihood that an interaction between individuals cause a recruit.
This path brings to an increase in the number of individuals becoming dissidents
and then insurgents. More dissidents means that more people oppose the regime.
More insurgents lead to more people available to commit violent acts. The greater
the violent incident intensity is, the greater the effect of incidents on anti-regime
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Figure 2.7: The effect of resilience on the insurgent recruiting model
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messages. And a stronger effect of incidents on messages increases the perceived
intensity of anti-regime messages, thus increasing the effect of anti-regime messages
on recruitment. A greater effect of anti-regime messages on recruitment means a
greater propensity to be recruited which then bring to a new spiral of violence. A
deep study has been done on these feedback dynamics and the authors have found
results that are comparable with some important theoretical assumptions: for in-
stance the state stability is strictly correlated with the onset of a civil war and the
literature describes the resilience of a state as inversely related to the occurrence
of civil war. The same result is discovered analyzing the insurgent recruiting model
and comparing the resilient function to a measure that determines the likelihood of a
civil war breaking out as defined by Hegre et al. (2001). They also tried to find some
critical points at which regime resilience will no longer be able to reject insurgent
behavior (in the short term, policies of reducing civil liberties could be effective while
in the longer term the same policies would undermine the social capacity of the state
and thus the regime resilience). Example of number of insurgents and of the regime
resilience while varying the state capacity is shown in figure 2.8.
Initially small changes in the capacities of the state (in the regime resilience) gen-
erate small increases in the number of insurgents. But a dramatic increase in the
number of insurgents is produced if the capacities drop at a certain time.
2.4 Gurr’s model
The Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project was initiated by Ted Robert Gurr in 1986
and has been based at the University of Maryland’s Center for International De-
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Figures 10a and 10b: Capacities and Loads 
 
As one can see from Figure 10, initially small declines in the capacities of the state 
produce small increases in the number of insurgents, i.e. the load on the system. But, at 
some point, further declines in the capacities, produce dramatic increases in the 
projection of insurgent growth – thus a ‘tipping point.’
6
  This shows the critical nature of 
choosing the correct policy prescriptions required for state stability.   
 
5.2 Policy Alternatives: Removing Insurgents vs. Reducing Anti-Regime Messages 
 
Using SDM, we can compare different policy alternatives.  In Figure 11, we identify two 
policy prescriptions:  
 (1)  the state might become better at removing insurgents, and  
 (2) the state might improve its ability to respond to anti-regime messages, 
dampening the message strength.   
Earlier, we identified that controlling the circulation of anti-regime messages (through 
curfews and other civil liberty limitations) would reduce the number of anti-regime 
messages in the short-term.  Considering the broader system, we see that a policy 
prescription which encourages choking messages through the suppression of liberties 
would undermine regime resilience, and in the long run, such a policy prescription would 
cause more harm than good.  Increasing the ‘Regime Voice’ is different.  It implies that 
the strength of the anti-regime messages might become diluted in an acceptable fashion.   
 
                                                 
6 The numbers presented in Figures 10a and 10b on the axes are based upon a specific case study., The true 
value of system dynamics does not come from empirical statements such as “if you reduce the economy 
10%, you will increase insurgents by 10%,” but rather “if the economy drops, one can expect to see an 
increase in insurgents, and based upon previous situations, if something is not done to re-establish the 
capacities, the state may tip into an unsustainable situation.”     
Figure 2.8: The resulting growth in insurgency with various changes in long-term
state capacities
velopme t and Conflict Management (CIDCM) since 1988. The project examines
and documents the status of ethnic and religious minority groups in all countries of
the world over the contemporary period, since 1946. The number of minority groups
that the project has studied has been growing during the years: from 227 in the 1990
to 284 in 2003. The theoretical framework of the causes of ethnopolitical conflict as
developed by Gurr is shown in figu e 2.9. The main bjective is explain these
social phenomena through causal mechanism. Although not conceived as a system
dynamics mo el, Gu r mode can be easily translated into a system dynamics ne.
I have built the structure of a possible system dynamics model based on the pro-
cesses of communal mobilization for protest and rebellion according to Gurr. It is
shown in figure 2.10. It has been a first attempt and until now it has remained at
a qualitative level. In the model, the potential of communal rebellion is seen as a
function of structural or situational variables (group incentives, group capacity and
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Figure 1 - The Etiology of Ethnopolitical Conflict (Gurr,2000) 
The Salience of ethnocultural identity is 
a function of: 
o Extend of cultural differentials vis -à-vis 
other groups  
o Comparative advantage or disadvantage 
o Intensity of past and current conflicts with 
the state and rival groups 
 
Incentives for ethnocultural action are a 
function of: 
o Overcoming collective disadvantages vis -
à-vis other groups 
o Regaining lost political autonomy  
o Resistance against repressive state control 
 
Domestic Opportunities for ethnopolitical action are enhanced by:  
o Breakup of old states and establishment of new ones 
o Transitions from one type of regime to another, especially shifts from 
autocracy to democracy 
o Leadership transitions and formations of new ruling coalitions 
Domestic political factors that 
encourage strategies of protest: 
o Democratic norms, institutions 
o Strong states with ample resources 
o Traditions of elite accommodation of 
segmental interest (class, religion, 
ethnicity) 
Domestic political factors that 
encourage strategies of rebellion: 
o Authoritarian norms, institutions 
o Weak states with limited resources 
o History of elite reliance on repression to 
control challenges  
ETHNOPOLITICAL 
ACTION 
International sources of support for ethnopolitical action: 
o Global doctrines of nationalism, indigenous rights, and minority rights 
o Regional and global networks of ethnic kindred and co-religionists  
o Diffusion and contagion of ethnopolitical conflict among similar groups 
o External political and material support  
Group capacity for collective action is a function of: 
o The salience of ethnocultural identity 
o Shared incentives 
o Territorial concentration 
o Preexisting group cohesion 
o Coalitions among diverse segments and contending leaders 
o Authenticity of leadership  
Figure 2.9: Ethnopolitical framework Gurr (2000)
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Figure 2.10: Gurr’s system dynamic model
opportunities for collective action) that influence the ethnic’s group decision to rebel
or not.
The independent variables are usually divided in three groups. The first group consist
of incentives for collective action and include history of political autonomy, collective
disadvantages, repression by the state: incentives derive, for instance, from the fact
that past losses can create resentments, anticipation of future losses can create fears,
and the potential for future gains can create hopes and so on (incentives include
both rational and emotive components). The second group of factors reflects the
group’s capacity for collective action and includes the strength of group identity and
the degree of militant mobilization: Gurr argues that, having a territorial base, a
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preexisting organization and an authentic leadership, makes rebellion more feasible.
The third category regards factors affecting the groups opportunities for collective
action, such as recent major changes in the political structure of the political regime:
state power, regime instability, and regime type, but also transitions, various types of
foreign support for the group (or the state)(Gurr and Moore (1996), Gurr and Harff
(1998), Gurr (2000)). The model built by Gurr describes some causal relationships
between variables but it doesn’t describe complete feedback loops, and in conflict
situations it can be fundamental to understand in which way variables reinforce or
neutralize each other.
For instance, in the qualitative system dynamics model I have built, some feedback
loops can be easily identified, they are shown in figure 2.4 where a plus sign (+)
indicates that a change in the first variable (at the tail of the arrow) causes a change
in the second variable (at the head of the arrow) in the same directions. A minus
sign (-) indicates that a change in the first variable causes a change in the second
variable in the opposite directions: if the government adopt a repressive control on a
minority group, the group identity is strengthen, some grievances can became active
and the potential of communal protest or rebellion can increase thus reinforcing
the group identity in a dangerous loop of violence. At the same time, the same
repressive control diminishes the capacity for mobilization and then the potential of
rebellion of the group, and this can bring the government to relax the repression and
forms a balancing loop. On the basis of the indicators defining incentives, capacity
and opportunities, it can be possible to find the politically active groups which
are at greatest risk of ethno-political rebellion. According to Gurr’s model, serious
future rebellions are most likely among groups with high incentives and medium
to high capacity and opportunities. If it is clear that the beginning of a conflict
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2.11: Loops from the Gurr’s model
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is ethnically motivated, or if ethnicity is a real factor, then the model can provide
some useful insights. The use of only structural conditions limits the use of the
model in the sense that predictions are not easy to be derived. And indeed, with
the intention of passing from a model of risk assessment to a more dynamic early
warning model of violent ethnic conflict, Gurr and Harff (1998) have included new
theoretical variables called accelerators. They are political events that act together to
increase instability. Their research suggests that the occurrence of a large number of
accelerators events in a short period occur before the outbreak of large-scale violence
and that these events thus exponentially increase the likelihood of geno/politicide.
An example of an accelerator event is the threat to core symbols of ethnic group
identity or the occurrence of violent opposition by kindred groups in neighboring
countries... According to the authors, the causal role of these factors is similar to
that of background conditions: they generate escalation by increasing incentives and
they affect capabilities and opportunities to rebel. These propositions could be tested
building a system dynamics model, trying for instance to focus on their frequency in
the escalation process and on improving the capability of the model to make short
term predictions.
2.5 Ethnic Terrorism Model
In the previous section I have tried a first attempt to build a system dynamics model
from the original model of Gurr considering a generic type of minority group. In
the reality, the MAR project has identified six different classes of minority groups:
Ethnonationalist, Indigenous, Ethnoclass, Communal Contender, Religious Sect, Na-
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tional Minority4(Gurr (2000)). We have already seen how some causal relations have
been discovered between the main variables but that the use of an analytical tool
as the system dynamics can allow to extrapolate the cycles of violence and to study
the complete feedback loops that originate from this complex problem. Since the
problem of terrorism, especially after 11th september 2001, has acquired more im-
portance, Akcam and Asal (2005) have taken in consideration the dynamics of the
Ethnonationalist groups5, one of the six original class of minority groups. Ethnic vi-
olence has been studied with statistics and qualitative models but, according to the
authors, no work has been done on specific ethnic terrorism. Their attempt to study
the causes of ethnic terror with system dynamics can thus be of great importance.
The aim is also to discover the relation between the ethnic policies of government
and the behavior of ethnic groups. The main variables are the one considered in the
previous section, incentives, capacity and opportunities for collective action. From
the relations between these variables (to which it is added group identity) the model
is built. (see figure 2.12). The other variables that are present in the qualitative
diagram are all taken from the literature on ethnic conflict and that are considered
by Gurr (2000), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Goodwin (2001), Sambanis (2001) and
others as the key factors in explaining conflict.
Among the feedback loops highlighted by the authors, I have numbered the ones
that have connection with the qualitative system dynamics model I have built in the
previous section (see figure 2.13 and figure 2.14). The loop number 1 underlined how
4For an explanation of each class see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/
5Ethnonationalist groups are defined as follow: These are regionally concentrated peoples with a
history of organized political autonomy with their own state, traditional ruler, or regional govern-
ment, who have supported political movements for autonomy at some time since 1945 (from the
MAR web site)
2.5. ETHNIC TERRORISM MODEL 65
Figure 2.12: ETM Model
a policy of repression adopted by the state decrease the group’s capacity for rebellion
(the resources dedicated to the rebellion for instance). The Government repression
affect also other variables that reduce the potential of rebellion, like the Leadership,
International support for ethnic group and Territorial concentration, as shown in loop
5, 2 and 3 respectively (balancing loops). The loop number 4 instead describes how
an increasing repression by the government creates opportunities for ethnic leaders to
mobilize the group thus increasing the potential of rebellion (reinforcing loop).
The model is coherent with our attempt, the two feedback loops I have taken as ex-
amples in the previous section are both present (the first one, for which an increasing
repression by the government creates opportunities for ethnic leaders to mobilize the
66 CHAPTER 2. CAUSAL MODELS
(a) Loop 1: Repression decreases rebellion
(b) Loop 2: Government repression affects interna-
tional support
(c) Loop 3: Government repression decreases terri-
torial concentration of group
Figure 2.13: Loops from the Gurr’s model
2.5. ETHNIC TERRORISM MODEL 67
(a) Loop 4: Repression increases incentives for rebellion
(b) Loop 5: Repression affects leadership (prisoning or killing
leaders for instance...)
Figure 2.14: Loops from the Gurr’s model
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group thus increasing the potential of rebellion can be compared with loop number
4, while the second one, for which the repression decreases the possibility of rebellion
can be compared with loops 1,2,3,5). The authors have tested the model on the
“Kurds in Turkey” case but, since they did not made available the data in the paper,
my analysis of their model remain at a qualitative level.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have analyzed models whose aim is to find casual relations among
variables so that a study of the dynamics of a conflict is allowed. In particular the
role of Computer Simulation through system dynamics has been discussed looking at
three existing models and one which seems to map in an almost one-to-one way into
a system dynamics model. System dynamics can indeed be an useful instrument in
conflict analysis: one of the crucial point to remind is in fact that in complex situa-
tions minimal actions can create unthinkable behaviors and the concept of feedback
loops is thus appropriate. The first model I have looked at is the Lateral Pressure
one. The model appears to have some positive aspects but also many drawbacks.
The context of domestic and international conflicts is very complex. System Dynam-
ics seems a good instrument for a study of the kind, but in my opinion it is really
difficult to achieve useful insights from this model without adding some more infor-
mation. I did not enter in detail on the lateral pressure theory, but it seems not too
actual. Even the variable population, which in the model could be considered as one
of the simplest to operationalize, is nowadays a very complex variable. The feelings
of different groups within a population may lead to very different behaviors. There is
the need of differentiating the perceptions and behaviors within a population, focus-
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ing on their causes such as ethnic tensions, social disintegration or fragmentation and
social and civil unrest. This model can possibly be utilized, with a good sensitivity
analysis tool, for placing some past events in the right context but it does not seems
to have a significant predictive power. The second model, the State Stability model,
seems to have some interesting aspects while having strong drawbacks: it shows that
even if the field of conflicts is a very complex one, system dynamics can bring useful
insights both theoretically and practically, testing hypothesis and predicting some
macro behaviors. The stability model of this section is only a little part of a more
general model: it studies only anti-regime messages related to dissident-insurgent
population. According to the authors, enlarging the model to other key loads can
help to better understand the sources and consequences of state stability. I think,
however, that the base of the model, the resilience of a state, have to be considered
in a different manner. One of the main characteristic of system dynamics is the
focus on the importance of feedback mechanisms and there are no effects of feedback
on the variable resilience. The fact that economy, regime legitimacy, political and
social capacity are considered as exogenous variables limit the model to a too much
simplified one and, indeed, the results of figure 2.8 are quite trivial. The third model
I have taken into account, Minority at risk model, is not an existing system dynam-
ics model but indeed a model which I have translated into a new one. It would be
interesting to further develop this attempt, especially with the new addiction of the
trigger factors. Accelerators could in fact give to the model a more realistic vision of
the reality. The last model, ETM, tries exactly to do that for a specific part of the
theoretic assumptions of Gurr’s project. It is difficult to add insights and critics to
the model because of the lack of applications but it seems anyway to be a promising
and interesting step forward the construction of practical modeling tools to analyze
conflicts.
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Chapter 3
Conflict phases through Hidden
Markov chains and Cluster
analysis
3.1 The conflict cycle
A conflict is in itself something dynamic which develops along a succession of cycles
which constitute often a pattern common to different conflicts. The capability of
discovering such patterns and to detect the transitions from one phase to another in
specific situation is key to any early warning method.
An example of different forms of conflict which can be viewed as successive phases in
a conflict escalation path are the ones described by Schmalberger and Alker (2001).
Schmalberger and Alker introduce “three variables that constitute conflict in its
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generic form, and can help us to identify and distinguish different forms of conflict.[
. . . ] The first variable [. . . ] describes an oppositional relation between groups. [. . . ]
As a second variable [they] choose the use of violence. The use of violence is the
single most common variable used in the literature to distinguish types of conflicts.
[. . . ] As a third variable [they] introduce opposition-relevant sequential expectations.
[E]xpectations [is] a most useful variable because it not only allows one to distinguish
violent and nonviolent forms of conflict, it connects them. For instance, a dispute is
characterized by the expectation of a possible, subsequent crisis. If a crisis does occur,
it continues the underlying opposition of the dispute, and in fact is premissed on its
nonresolution, so that a different mode of behavior is justified” (Schmalberger and
Alker, 2001). Accordingly to the three main variables, four main types of conflicts
and hence of conflict phases are defined (see table 3.1). To be able to describe the
dynamic of a conflict, abatement phases and settlement phases are introduced. An
abatement phase is not the solution of the conflict, but a phase in which there is no
expectation of an escalation. For instance the abatement phase corresponding to a
dispute is one in which the first two variables are the same as in the dispute (the
divergent claims are still there, and there is non violence), but there is no expectation
of threats of using violence. The same for the other three phases. “An abatement
phase is the transitional stage from where a conflict can move toward its resolution
or a renewed escalation”. A settlement phase instead is the conclusion of a conflict,
a situation in which the “conflicting parties resolve the opposition underlying the
conflict in a noneliminative fashion, establish or reconstitute mutually recognized
actors and/or institutional processes in which opposition claims are accommodated,
and end intergroup violence and the expectation that other such episodes of the same
conflict might begin again” (Schmalberger and Alker, 2001).
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Form of
conflict
Opposition Use of Violence Expectations
Dispute divergent claims are acco-
modated within existing
institutional processes
none possible threats of
using violence
Crisis divergent claims are acco-
modated within existing
institutional processes
incidental and spo-
radic
possible use of lim-
ited or massive vio-
lence
Limited vi-
olence
divergent claims are
expressed by the use of
violence
regular, sistematic,
and restrained
possible use of mas-
sive violence
Massive vi-
olence
divergent claims are
expressed by the use of
violence
regular, systematic,
and unrestrained
destruction, elim-
ination, uncondi-
tional surrender
Table 3.1: Conflict phases according to Schmalberger and Alker (2001)
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Figure 3.1: A Grammar of possible conflict phases sequences.
A conflict is characterized by a sequence of phases (types of conflict) and of transi-
tions from one to the other. Not all the transitions are possible. As suggested by
Schmalberger and Alker (2001), we can define a grammar of possible conflict phases
sequences. There is a wide literature on conflict cycles and different ways of decom-
posing a conflict in phases have been proposed, for instance the sequence dispute,
conflict, hostilities, post-conflict, post dispute, settlement, is used in the CASCON
Project (Bloomfield and Moulton, 1997), while the sequence conflict, escalation, de-
escalation, relative calm has been used by Bond et al. (2004a). In fig. 3.1 it is shown
all the possible transitions that can occur between the phases dispute, crisis, limited
violence, massive violence, abatement and settlement which are used in the CEWS
project of Alker and Schmalbeger (Alker et al. (2001)), where the arrows from one
phase to another represent feasible transitions.
Note that from an abatement phase we can go to any of the preceding phases, so
that we may have for instance a sequence dispute - crisis - limited violence - massive
violence - abatement, followed by a new sequence of the same type or shorter (e.g.
limited violence - massive violence - abatement). These two sequences represent dif-
ferent episodes of the same conflict, and it is possible that passing from one to the
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other the foundational opposition of the conflict has changed; for instance it can be
the claim for autonomy of a minority in the first episode and the claim for complete
independence in the second. During the conflict the actors may undergo political or
social evolutions which may change their expectations.
The objective of such types of models “is to develop an early warning capability
that provides reliable estimates of conflict potential; generates “warnings” months in
advance of serious escalation; and enables analysts to differentiate among different
types of conflict”(Schmalberger and Alker, 2001). Of course, to this purpose it is es-
sential to have a good data base of event data relevant to the conflict, to be updated
continuously, possibly daily.
3.2 Sequence analysis: forecasting using Hidden
Markov Models
A possible approach to analyze the structure of a conflict cycle, which has been
proposed by Schrodt (2000a), is based on the theory of Markov chains, or what
is called Hidden Markov Models (HMM)(see also Schrodt (2000b) and Bond et al.
(2004a)), which are Markov chain models, in which the states are not directly ob-
served; they are rather inferred from the presence or absence of a given sequence of
symbols. HMM is often used in speech recognition, comparison of protein sequences,
in modeling the control of cellular phone networks ecc..., all cases in which the se-
quences to be compared are noisy, that is, contain missing, erroneous and extraneous
elements.
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A typical Markov chain model is defined as a pair (S, a), where S = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
is a finite set of n possible states, , and a = [aij] is a n × n matrix of transition
probabilities, where the element aij is the probability that, assuming the system to
be in state xi, a transition from xi to the new state xj occurs (see figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Hidden Markov Model
Here, the states are the diverse conflict phases, and the transition matrix provides
the probabilities of transition from one phase to another. Since conflicts can display
sharp and sudden change, HMM applications in conflict situations allow jump tran-
sitions between states (Bond et al. (2004a) and Bond et al. (2004b)) and not only to
consecutive ones. The problem is that we do not know exactly in which state/phase
the system is; what we know is only a set of elements (events, variable values, . . . )
which characterize the particular phase in which the conflict is. For instance when
we observe continuous fighting over a certain period of time we can label it armed
conflict. We may be in a situation in which the information we have suggests that
the conflict is either in a dispute phase or in a crisis one, but it is not easy to say more
3.2. SEQUENCE ANALYSIS: FORECASTING USING HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS 77
precisely which of the two phases we are facing. So, what is done is to codify a finite
set of symbols representing events, facts and variables relative to the conflict, and for
each subset of symbols and for each state, we define the probability bi, i = 1...n that
a system in that state produce that subset of symbols (yi, i = 1...n). That allows us,
given a set of observed symbols to infer the state (or the set of most likely states) of
the system (conflict situation). The individual symbols in the realm of international
relations can be events like visits, agreements, armed raids, bombings and so on,
they are taken from the WEIS “cue” categories, the 2-digit numeric codes numbered
1-22, or from the IDEA categories(1-157) (See Appendix B and C for a description
of WEIS and IDEA). The sequence of these individual symbols correspond to the
observation sequence. Bond et al. (2004b), who used hidden Markov models to de-
rive monthly forecasts of conflict intensity in Indonesia over a period of 52 weeks
in 1999, discharged the use of an high number of symbols because as the number
of events or symbols increase, the probabilities of the events decrease making the
results extremely difficult to interpret. They have collapsed all the events in only
14 categories thus making output more easier to interpret. The 14 symbol set used
for this analysis are: blame, threats, opposition, demands, coercion, violence, armed
conflict, praise, promise, accommodation, appeal, support, cooperation, rewards.
Hidden Markov models must be trained with empirical data. Beginning with some
model (S, a), random or preselected, a set of observed sequences1 from a variety of
countries are run through the current model to estimate the expectations of each
model parameter. For example, we would expect to find more “peaceful” events oc-
curring in states of relative calm than in states of high intensity conflict and, since the
IDEA distinguishes among 249 social, economic and political events, it is possible to
1In Bond the observation sequence is partitioned into training vectors of length between 500 and
4000 symbols
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differentiate subsets that occur only in a certain phase. Clusters of similar behavior
(for example in terms of aggressiveness) provide the link between the non-observable
states and the actual events. For instance, if repeated armed raids, aerial attacks,
bombings, etc are present in the observation sequence, then it seems difficult to claim
that we are in a state of relative calm. The training is done using the Baum-Welch
algorithm (Rabiner (1989)) that finds the model that assigns the training data the
highest likelihood converging to optimal values for the model parameters (S, a). Ac-
cording to Bond et al. (2004a) the training procedure takes not too much time, so
it is advisable to make the re-training as frequently as possible as new data became
available in order to fine tune the models. The frequency of the re-retraining de-
pends on the forecast window we are interested in, for instance they consider weekly
or monthly window and re-train the model once a month. This estimation allows to
build a set of consistent scenarios (between 1000 and 5000) to be used for compar-
ing the observed sequences with unknown sequences: if we have some sequences of
events for a critical country, our aim is to find the model that better represents the
situation of that country. The model chosen is that which maximizes the probability
of generating the observed sequence, and it is used for forecasting.
The structure of Hidden Markov models is relatively simple and the number of pa-
rameters is proportional to the states (between 4 and 6 generally) times the number of
event types (14 in the case of Bond et al.). At the same time, there is the drawback of
the diffuse parameters structure that is really difficult to interpret: the great number
of events not bringing to situations of conflict (conflict situations are rare events) and
the indeterminacy of the estimates produced by the Baum-Welch algorithm limit the
possibility of making predictions. In this sense HMMs models are similar to neural
networks even if the former have the advantage of a quick estimation. The stochas-
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tic nature of HMMs allows to deal with noise output and indeterminate time which
is exactly the case of conflict situations. Another advantage is that HMMs do not
require the use of interval-level aggregative methods using event data scales such as
those proposed by Goldstein. HMMs use only the original disaggregated events and
models the relationships between events by using different symbol observation prob-
abilities in different states. HMMs also requires no temporal aggregation which is
very important in early warning problems where critical periods in the development
of a crisis can occur over a week or even a day. HMMs are among the methods more
promising in the field even if the vast structure of the coefficient has been, until now,
a great obstacle to the realization of a robust early warning method.
3.3 Interval-level time series: Cluster analysis
A different approach to conflict cycles analysis is based on clustering techniques and it
has been proposed by Schrodt and Gerner (1996). In their paper, they choose as test
bed the Middle East conflict, and have created an event data set using as source the
Reuters headlines, KEDS as machine-coding system and WEIS as coding scheme. In
particular, for the period from April 1979 to July 1996, they have considered all the
events involving any two countries (dyads) among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
the Palestinians, Syria, the United States and USSR/Russia, with the exception of
the dyads USA-USSR and USSR-USA. That means that they have considered all the
events in which someone belonging to one of the countries has done something jointly,
in favor or against someone (or something) belonging to another country in the area;
as an example, a US envoy meeting the Israeli first minister, a Israeli airplane hitting
a target in South Lebanon, or a Palestinian suicide bomber blowing himself in a bus
80CHAPTER 3. CONFLICT PHASES THROUGHHIDDENMARKOVCHAINS AND CLUSTER ANALYSIS
in Jerusalem. As for the USA-USSR and USSR-USA dyads, the events involving
them were deemed only rarely of interest to the Middle East conflict. The basic
assumption in this study is that within each conflict phase there is a relative stability
of the interactions among the different actors, while sudden changes happens in the
transition from one phase to the next. The objective of their study was to detect
those critical patterns of event flows which characterized the transitions from one
phase to another. In order to perform the study, 80,000 events have been extracted
from Reuter reports, and coded with KEDS into WEIS events.
In order to detect such patterns, the different actors are considered and for each
dyad, the different events involving them, are aggregated in one single value, using
some aggregating technique, such as the Goldstein scale2 or the IDEA scale.
Being 54 the dyads considered (7× 8− 2), the aggregation resulted in a sequence of
points xt ∈ <54, one for each month from April 79 to July 96. So doing for each time
t, we have a vector xt = (x1t, x2t, . . . , xpt), where xjt is the number representing in a
aggregated way the interaction within the jth dyad.
The analysis of the sequence {xt} allows to determine the behavior of the system
identifying the transition points between two consecutive phases. In order to do so,
a “stability measure” LMLt has been introduced:
LMLt =
1
k
k∑
i=1
‖ xt − xt−k ‖ −1
k
k∑
i=1
‖ xt − xt+k ‖ (3.1)
where k is an integer parameter and ‖ x − y ‖ measures the distance 3 between x
2See the Appendix C for the description of Goldstein scale
3The distance between points is calculated using one of the two metrics:
• Euclidean metric: ‖ x− y ‖=
√∑54
i=1(xi − yi)2
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and y.
If LMLt > ∆, where ∆ is a properly chosen threshold, then the point xt is closer
to the k points following it in time than to the k points that precede it: a new
phase/cluster is thus formed. In figure 3.3 the results for the original clustering
algorithm in the case of k = 4, correlation metric and ∆ = 0.3 are shown. The
vertical lines derive from an a priori analysis in which a rough distinction of the
phases is done. The clusters defined a priori are then used as a reference point.
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Figure 4.  Four Month Lag minus Lead Measure of the Difference in the Distance
of a Data Point to Points Preceding and Following It
Note: The ! = 0.3 line shows the threshold that delineates most of the a priori clusters in the data.
The distances are computed using a correlation metric.  Vertical lines correspond to the a priori
phase transitions identified in the Table 1.  X-axis tick marks are 3-month intervals.
Note to editors: Many of the labels in this figure printed poorly in MS-Word but are okay when
the figure is printed directly from MS-Excel.  We will produce the camera-ready versions from
Excel.
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Figure 3.3: LML > ∆ clustering algorithm: Four Month Lag minus Lead Measure
of the Difference in the Distance of a Data Point to Points Preceding and Following
It (Schrodt and Gerner (1996)).
If we take into consideration just the LML measure, no forecasting is possible since,
if we are at time t and we want to calculate the stability measure, we need both the
• Correlation metric: ‖ x− y ‖= 1− rx,y where r is the Pearson product moment
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points that are before(past) and after(future) t. From an analysis of the pattern of
LML, we can note that, before a cluster change occur, the stability measure has a
rapid increase several months before. This means that the distance from the cluster
center and the point in time we are analyzing becomes bigger as a break point is
approaching and at the same time the density of the cluster, the extent to chich the
points within the cluster are close to each other, becomes smaller.
This consideration is used by the author for building an early warning indicator, in
fact the density of the cluster at time t can be calculated in function of the only
points that are known prior time t, and if looking at the density of the cluster at
time t we discover that it is diminishing, then, there is the possibility that a new
cluster is forming and thus a possible occurrence of a cluster change.
A cluster density change (CDC) measure is thus introduced as follow: First, the total
distance between the points of a four consecutive months cluster is calculated:
CDt =
1
6
2∑
i=0
3∑
j=i+1
‖ xt−i − xt−j ‖ (3.2)
There are six possible comparisons within a cluster of four months, xt to xt−1, xt
to xt−2, . . . , xt−2 to xt−3. Therefore the divisor six is used to compute the average.
Then, the real density is evaluated through the difference between CDt at points
that are 8 months apart:
CDCt = CDt − CDt−8 (3.3)
The number of eight months was established empirically. This factor, dependent on
the particular context and on the time required for political decision to be made,
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is not consider as critical. The CDC measure can be seen as proportional to the
probability that a major change occur more than to a a yes/no prediction. The
experiments done by the authors are consistent with the results obtained with the
LML measure as shown in figure 3.4. The indicator can provide a two to six month
warning but the author has underlined the problem of false positive present in some
critical situation. A major drawback is that it gives no information on what kind of
change will happen but just whether a change is going to happen.
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Figure 5.  Eight Month Change in Four Month Cluster Density as an Early Warning
Indicator
Note: The horizontal line shows the threshold that provides an early warning indicator for most of
the a priori clusters in the data. Vertical lines correspond to the a priori phase transitions identified
in Table 1.  X-axis tick marks are 3-month intervals.
Note to editors: Many of the labels in this figure printed poorly in MS-Word but are okay when
the figure is printed directly from MS-Excel.  We will produce the camera-ready versions from
Excel.
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Figure 3.4: CDC: Eight M nth C ange in Four Month Cluster Density as an Early
Warning Indicator (Schrodt and Gerner (1996))
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Chapter 4
Conflict phases through
Multicriteria
4.1 Introduction
As pointed out in the previous chapters, crucial to the construction of effective and
reliable Early Warning methods is the availability of good datasets and of theoretic
and analytical tools to understand a conflict and to analyze its development. Far
from being static a conflict often unfolds over time along a successions of phases, and
it is essential to be able to recognize such phases. Event data are usually considered
more suited for early warning purposes than structural data since they make possible
the monitoring of the evolution of the situation in the field almost day by day. The
same is not possible with structural variables whose values are updated much less
often, in most cases every year. Still structural variables are very important and
may also in some cases be fundamental for a correct interpretation of the event data.
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For instance the outbreak of the second Intifada in Palestine, in 2000, can hardly
be seen in terms of day by day events if we do not take into consideration also the
worsening of the economic indicators in the occupied territories: income per capita,
poverty, unemployment, etc.. Similarly, environmental stress is a crucial variable:
see, as an example, the role of environmental scarcity in the Rwandan Genocide
(Ohlsson, 1999). The use of structural data might make possible the realization of
cross-regional analyses. For instance two similar patterns of event data in two differ-
ent regions may correspond to different conflict phases in presence of different values
for the structural variables. Conversely different structural variables patterns may
do that two distinct conflict situations be recognized as belonging to the same type
of phase, also if the event data patterns are different.
For this reason it seems reasonable to use Multicriteria techniques for the conflict
phase analysis. In fact Multicriteria methods are designed to provide a flexible
framework for modern decision analysis. They can deal simultaneously with a large
number of alternatives, a large number of criteria and a wide range of data (qualita-
tive, quantitative, fuzzy, linguistic parameters), combining assessment methods with
judgment methods (some of the structural data are cardinal, such as for instance
the population or the Gini index; other like the Undp’s Human development index
(HDI) are ordinal1; other are only qualitative, as is the case of freedom of the press
indicators, which may be represented by values of the type high, medium, low and
poor...).
Moreover, in the previous chapter I have shown how Hidden Markov models and
Clustering methods have been applied, using event data only: the former without
the need of aggregating the data but with a complex structure to analyze and the
1UNDP is the United Nations Development Programme: see http://www.undp.org/
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latter with the aggregation through the use of a scale such as for instance the Gold-
stein one with the consequent loss of relevant information. An important advantage
of Multicriteria methods is that data does not need to be transformed into a unique
measurement in order to allow aggregation of criteria and comparison between al-
ternatives and that results do not come out of a black box, so making difficult their
interpretation. Multicriteria approaches make explicit the options and the crite-
ria.
Lets remember which is the problem we are addressing:
Since we know that a certain number of phases (see section 3.1) characterize a con-
flict situation, we are interested in grouping actions (violent or peaceful) occurring
in time into homogeneous classes representing the conflict phases, so that we can
understand which phases are more likely to occur in the next future (this anal-
ysis might also lead to deepening our knowledge on the conflict phases theory).
If the categories are pre-defined (classification problems), to solve these problems,
many MCDA approaches, like UTADIS method (Devaud and Groussaud (1980)),
filtering methods based on concordance or discordance (Slowinski and Stefanowski
(1994)), PROAFTN((Belacel, 2000)), could be considered (supervised learning meth-
ods). Since it is very difficult to have an exact pre-definition of the phases of a conflict,
we are much interested in clustering, an unsupervised technique, which require only
an apriori number of the clusters/classes. One of the most known algorithm among
clustering methods is the k-means algorithm (MacQueen (1967)). It allows to group
the alternatives into categories in such a way that the distances between the alter-
natives, within a same category are the shortest, while the distances between the
centers of different categories are the largest. Here I will not use Multicriteria for
making explicit classification but as a part of an extension of k-means algorithm.
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This extension, the k-means multicriteria clustering algorithm (MCC-algorithm), is
originally proposed by Smet and Guzma´n (2004), and it has been tested on real-world
data sets in the field of country risk problem and diagnosis of firms. Multicriteria
appears in the definition of the distance between alternatives.
In the next section I discuss the type of data which will be used in my analysis.
The algorithm is described in details in section 4.4, while in section 4.4.7 its use
on real data from the Nepal internal conflict is discussed. Then I present a possible
application of the algorithm in order to analyze the conflict phases and to make some
predictions. Finally in section 4.5 some final remarks and future research lines are
presented.
4.2 Data
In my analysis I start from the historical data (in principle both structural data and
event data) relative to the conflict under study, which I assume to be in the form of
a set
X = x(t1),x(t2), . . . ,x(tn), (4.1)
where t1, t2, . . . , tn are the points in time at which the vector x has been evaluated,
with tj < tj+1, and tj+1 − tj = ∆, for each j = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, with ∆ a given
constant (a day, a week, a month, . . . ), and x(ti) = (x1(ti), x2(ti), . . . , xm(ti)), for all
ti. For each point in time I have the values of m variables x1(ti), x2(ti), . . . , xm(ti).
These variables will be called criteria (see figure 4.1). An example of the meaning
of alternatives and criteria can be: if n=12 (one year), ∆=one month, m=3 and
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Figure 4.1: Alternatives and Criteria
among the three criteria the first monitors the number of bombing incidents, then,
if in march we have 3 bombing incidents, then we will have x1(t3) = 3.
The characteristics of the conflict phases are not known in advance; I assume only
that the number of phases, k, is given. In the calibration phase different values for
k may be tried. Typical values for k, which can be found in the conflict analysis
literature, are between 4 and 6 (Schmalberger and Alker, 2001).
In a scale which goes from a maximum of stability and of welfare for the population
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to a maximum of instability/violence and a minimum of welfare, I can assume that
the vectors x(tj) can be somehow ranked, although the ranking might not be a total
order. I can think of defining three relations on X, a relation of preference, P , a
relation of indifference, I, and one of incomparability, J , so that for each pair x(ti)
and x(tj), I say:
x(ti)Px(tj) if x(ti) is preferred to x(tj), (4.2)
x(ti)Ix(tj) if x(ti) is indifferent to x(tj), (4.3)
x(ti)Jx(tj) if x(ti) is incomparable to x(tj). (4.4)
As an example one might consider preferable a situation in which there is a reasonably
high life standard for all, no violence and in which the freedom of the media is low,
to one in which the wealth distribution is highly unequal, there is violence but the
press is completely free. On the other hand, a state characterized by high inequalities
(with large segments of the population starving) and no violence may be considered
to be incomparable to one in which nobody is starving but there is a widespread
and high level of violence; i.e. they cannot be considered as equivalent but it is not
possible to say which of the two is better. The first problem we face is how to define
such three relations. I can assume that a total order can be defined on the domains
of the single criteria that form the vector x(ti). That seems to be reasonable: the
Gini index can be ordered from 1 (the worst case) to 0, the literacy index can be
ranked from 0 (no literate adult) to 1 (100% of literate adults), violence from the
highest value to a no-violence situation, and so on. If that is true, then outranking
methods2, such as for instance ELECTRE (Benayoun et al. (1966)), can be used to
2Outranking methods constitute a class of ordinal ranking algorithms for multicriteria decision
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define the relations on X.
4.3 ELECTRE method
ELECTRE methods3, developed for the first time in 1965, consist of two main pro-
cedures:
the construction of one or several outranking relation(s) which has the aim of
comparing in a comprehensive way each pair of alternatives.
a procedure that is used to elaborate advises from the results obtained in the
first phase. The nature of the advises depends on the problematic (choosing,
ranking or sorting).
There are different version of ELECTRE methods and they are still developing:
in 1965 the first version, called ELECTRE I, was a method for choosing the best
alternative(s) from a given set of alternatives. ELECTRE II is instead used for
dealing with the problem of ranking alternatives from the best option to the worst.
ELECTRE TRI is a version for sorting alternatives into predefined and ordered
categories. Several other versions have been developed during the years (ELECTRE
III, IV, Iv. IS etc...). The methods are all based on the same fundamental concepts
but are operationally somewhat different.
making. They have been proposed for aggregating preference information on several criteria into
an overall preference structure.
3The acronym ELECTRE stands for: ELimination Et Choix Traduisant la REalit?e (ELimina-
tion and Choice Expressing the REality)
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As pointed out in the previous section, I’m interested in building a preference struc-
ture having a set of alternatives to be evaluated on different criteria. This can be
done using the procedure of the first phase of ELECTRE Methods: the construction
of the outranking relation. It is not necessary to utilize also the procedure of the
second phase because I will perform clustering through the MCC-algorithm. The
outranking relation will in fact be used for building the distance to be used in the
MCC-algorithm and that it will be described in the next section. For the outranking
purpose I have chosen ELECTRE TRI.
The basis of the method are thresholds and outranking. Using thresholds, the ELEC-
TRE TRI method seeks to build an outranking relation S, i.e. a relation that, for each
pairwise of alternatives, describe their preference relation. The relation S contains
the four relations P+, P−, I, J already seen in the previous section4.
The outranking relation is built as the following:
• compute the partial concordance indices cj(a, b) and cj(b, a) where j = 1, ...,m, and
m is the number of criteria.
• compute the overall concordance indices c(a, b).
• compute the partial discordance indices dj(a, b) and dj(b, a).
• compute the fuzzy outranking relation based on the credibility indices σ(a, b)
• determine a λ-cut of the fuzzy relation in order to obtain the outranking relation.
where:
gj(a) is the alternative a evaluated on the criterion j;
4Here the Preference relation P has been split in two, P+ and P−: aP+b means that a is
preferred to b while aP−b means that b is preferred to a
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cj(a, b) is the partial concordance index between a and b that expresses to which extent
the statement a is at least as good as b on criterion j is acceptable;
dj(a, b) is the partial discordance index between alternatives a and b for the criterion j
that expresses to which extent the criterion j is opposed to the assertion a is at least
as good as b
c(a, b) is the global concordance index s that express to which extent the evaluations of a
and b on all criteria are concordant with the assertion “a outranks b”;
vj(a) is the veto threshold for a with respect to the criterion j;
pj(a) is the preference threshold for a with respect to the criterion j;
qj(a) is the indifference threshold for a with respect to the criterion j;
and vj(a) ≥ pj(a) ≥ qj(a) ≥ 0
wj is the weight of the criterion j;
σ(a, b) is the credibility relation between alternatives a e b and it expresses to which extent
a outranks b according to the global concordance index c(a, b) and to the discordance
indices dj(a, b) for all the criteria5;
S(a, b) is the outranking relation between alternatives a and b.
In the following I will consider only criteria with an increasing direction of preference
(that is, if g(a) > g(b) then a is better than b).
For each pairwise of alternatives a and b, the different functions introduced above
are defined analytically as follows:
5A global discordance indices is not necessary because if just one criterium opposes a veto, then
the assertion “a outranks b” is not credible at all
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1. the partial concordance indices cj(a, b):
cj(a, b) =

0, if gj(a) ≤ gj(b)− pj(b),
gj(a)−gj(b)+pj(b)
pj(b)−qj(b)) , if gj(b)− pj(b) < gj(a) ≤ gj(b)− qj(b),
1, if gj(b)− qj(b) < gj(a);
increasing preference
gj(a)
cj(a, b)
gj(b)-pj(b) gj(b)-qj(b) gj(b)
1
Figure 4.2: Concordance cj(a, b) for increasing criterion gj(a)
The concordance index is 0 up to the preference threshold, then increase linearly
and take a value from 0 to 1 between the preference threshold and the indifference
threshold and finally it is 1 after the indifference threshold (fig 4.2).
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2. the concordance indices:
c(a, b) =
∑m
j=0wj · cj(a, b)∑m
j=0wj
; (4.5)
3. the partial discordance indices dj(a, b):
dj(a, b) =

0, if gj(a) > gj(b)− pj(b),
gj(b)−gj(a)−pj(b)
vj(b)−pj(b)) , if gj(b)− vj(b) < gj(a) ≤ gj(b)− pj(b),
1, if gj(b)− vj(b) ≥ gj(a);
increasing preference
gj(a)
dj(a, b)
gj(b)-vj(b) gj(b)-pj(b) gj(b)
1
Figure 4.3: Discordance dj(a, b) for increasing criterion gj(a)
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The discordance index is 1 up to the veto threshold, then decreases linearly from 1
to 0 between the veto threshold and the preference threshold and finally it is 0 after
the preference threshold (fig 4.3).
4. credibility outranking relation:
σ(a, b) =

c(a, b) ·∏j∈F¯ 1−dj(a,b)1−c(a,b) , where F¯ = {j = 1, ..,m|dj(a, b) > c(a, b)},
c(a, b), if dj(a, b) ≤ c(a, b) ∀j.
This formula states that:
When no criteria are discordant σ(a, b) = c(a, b)
When a discordant criterion opposes a veto (dj(a, b) = 1) then σ(a, b) = 0
When a discordant criterion is such that c(a, b) < dj(a, b) < 1 then σ(a, b) < c(a, b)
due to the effect of the opposition on this criterion.
5. The λ-cut:
if (σ(a, b) >= λ) then S(a, b) = 1, else S(a, b) = 0. (4.6)
This allows us to build the outranking relation:
• S(a, b) = S(b, a) = 1 ⇒ aIb
• S(a, b) = 1 and S(b, a) = 0⇒ aP+b
• S(a, b) = 0 and S(b, a) = 1⇒ aP−b
• S(a, b) = S(b, a) = 0 ⇒ aJb
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4.4 The Multicriteria-clustering algorithm (MCC-
algorithm)
Once the order relations have been defined, I can apply the clustering algorithm pro-
posed by Smet and Guzma´n (2004) to partition the data into k groups. That does
not end the work because there is the problem of time: we want, at least in principle,
that a phase correspond to a connected interval of time, while a cluster may contain
points in time which can be away one from the other, without temporal contiguity;
we may also get isolated points. That calls for a further action to be performed on
the result obtained such as smoothing techniques, as described in section 4.4.5.
Each element x(ti) in our data space is characterized by a set ei = P (x(ti)) =
{P+(x(ti)), P−(x(ti)), I(x(ti)), J(x(ti))} (a profile that represents the outranking re-
lation of x(ti)), where
P+(x(ti)) = {x(tj) : x(ti)P+x(tj), j = 1, 2, . . . , n} = P1(ei),
P−(x(ti)) = {x(tj) : x(tj)P−x(ti), j = 1, 2, . . . , n} = P2(ei),
I(x(ti)) = {x(tj) : x(ti)Ix(tj), j = 1, 2, . . . , n} = P3(ei),
J(x(ti)) = {x(tj) : x(ti)Jx(tj), j = 1, 2, . . . , n} = P4(ei).
The preference structure can be put in a graph where the edges are the alternatives
and the arcs are the relation between them: see for example figure 4.4, in which
three alternatives are shown. The direction of the arrows indicate the direction of
preference: e1 and e2 are both preferred to e3 and incompatible to e5, e2 is preferred
to e1 and indifferent to e4 and so on...
Following Smet and Guzma´n (2004), I can define a distance in the data space as
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follows:
d(ei, ej) = 1−
∑4
r=1 |Pr(ei) ∩ Pr(ej)|
n
. (4.7)
Figure 4.4: An example of a preference structure for five alternatives
For instance from figure 4.4:
n = 5,
d(e1, e2): the two alternatives have in common the preference on e3 and the incom-
parability with e5 so d(e1, e2) = 1− 1+15 = 3/5
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d(e2, e5): the two alternatives have in common only the incomparability with e1 so
d(e2, e5) = 1− 15 = 4/5
The clustering algorithm partitions a set of data in k subsets or clusters, C1, C2, . . . , Ck,
trying to minimize the intra-cluster distances. Each cluster, Cj, is represented by a
centroid, cj. The centroid does not need to be one of the elements in the original
data set. In fact, I do not seek for an element in our data space, that is a vector
cj ∈ <n, but rather for its profile P (cj). Namely I look for that profile which is as
close as possible to the profiles of the elements belonging to Cj. This is done by a
voting procedure that update the centroids at the end of each iteration.
4.4.1 The algorithm
The input of our algorithm is a set of observations, X = {x(t1), ..., x(tn)}, and a
matrix E = {e1, e2, .., en}, where each ei contains the preference structure of the
observation x(ti): ei = P (x(ti)) = {P+(x(ti)), P−(x(ti)), I(x(ti)), J(x(ti))}, for all
x(ti), i = 1, ..., n. E can be computed by the ELECTRE TRI method described in
section 4.3. Note that the calibration of the parameters of this method is crucial and
needs to be done very carefully. The number of the desired clusters, k is given.
1. Randomly initialize k centroids c1, ..ck such that ∀j, ∃h: cj = eh and cj 6= cl ∀j, l =
1, ..., k. Each cluster Cj j = 1, .., k is associated with the centroid cj .
2. For each ei, i = 1, . . . , n, assign ei to that cluster Cj such that d(ei, cj) ≤ d(ei, ch), h =
1, . . . , k. Ties are resolved arbitrarily.
3. For all clusters Cj , j = 1, . . . , k, update the centroid cj .
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4. If there are any changes in the centroids, apply the Voting procedure then go to step
2, else stop.
4.4.2 The Voting procedure
The voting procedure update the centroids in such a way that they encompass at
their best, the characteristics of the cluster that they represent at each iteration.
The procedure consists of two steps:
1. Given, at a certain iteration of the algorithm, the elements belonging to cluster j,
and their profile P (·), for each element ei of our data set, for each cluster j = 1, . . . , k
and for each r = 1, . . . , 4 (r = 1 is for P+, r = 2 is for P−, etc. . . ), compute Njr(ei)
as the number of times that the observation i appears in the profiles of the elements
belonging to cluster j.
2. ∀r = 1, 2, 3, 4 define Pr(cj) (the profile of the centroid cj) as the set of elements ei
for which Njr(ei) ≥ Njr′(ei), ∀r′ 6= r,
In the first step, I compute ∀ei, a matrix Njr(ei) of size k × 4 that expresses how
many times ei appears in the profiles of the members of cluster j. In the second step,
I search for the maximum value in each row of the matrix. In such a way, I insert in
the r-th set of the centroid cj, only those elements that appear more frequently in
the r-th set of the members of cluster j.
4.4.3 An example
In order to better explain the MCC-algorithm, I propose a simple example. Suppose
that we have 4 alternatives for which the profiles are constructed and that we want
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to classify them in k = 2 clusters:
(for simplifying the notation I will write 1 instead of x(t1), 2 instead of x(t2) etc..):
Profiles for alternative 1 e1: P
+(1) = {2,3,4}, P−(1)={-}, I(1)={1}, J(1)={-};
Profiles for alternative 2 e2: P
+(2) = {3,4}, P−(2)={1}, I(2)={2}, J(2)={-};
Profiles for alternative 3 e3: P
+(3) = {-}, P−(2)={1,2}, I(3)={3,4}, J(3)={-};
Profiles for alternative 4 e4: P
+(4) = {-}, P−(4)={1,2}, I(4)={3,4}, J(4)={-};
The relations between alternatives can be shown in a graph as in figure 4.5, where
the direction of the arc identify the preference among them (double arrow means
indifference, no arc incompatibility):
Figure 4.5: Preference Structure for alternatives 1-4
Suppose that the algorithm takes, as initial centroids, the first two alternatives (step
1 of the algorithm):
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• c1=e1 (centroid of cluster C1), and c2=e2 (centroid of cluster C2).
The distance between all the alternatives and the centroids are calculated (step 2):
• d(e1, c1) = 0
d(e1, c2) = 1/2
d(e2, c1) = 1/2
d(e2, c2) = 0
d(e3, c1) = 1
d(e3, c2) = 3/4
d(e4, c1) = 1
d(e4, c2) = 3/4
The algorithm then assign each alternative to the cluster for which there is the
minimum distance between alternative and centroid:
C1= {1}
C2= {2, 3, 4}
• After, the update of the centroid is done (step 3).
The algorithm verifies how many times each alternative appears in the sets
P+(.), P−(.), I(.), J(.) of the members of each clusters. For the first alternative:
Njr(e1) =
 0 0 1 0
0 3 0 0

N13(e1) = 1 means that the alternative 1 appears one time in the preference
structure of all the members of cluster 1 (j = 1, first raw) and it appears only
in “I” structure (r = 3, third column) (cluster 1 has only one member, the
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alternative 1 itself).
N22(e1) = 3 means that the alternative 1 appears three time in the preference
structure of all the members of cluster 2 (j = 2) and, in particular it appears
in the P−(.) structure (r = 2) of alternatives 2, 3 and 4. After the definition
of the matrix, the algorithm takes, for each row, the maximum value and it
inserts the alternative in the preference set of the related centroid: for the first
raw, alternative 1 is thus put in the I(.) set of the new centroid of cluster 1.
In the second raw the maximum value is 3 in the second column: alternative 1
is put in the P−(.) set of the new centroid of cluster 2.
For the others alternatives:
Njr(e2) =
 1 0 1 0
0 2 0 0

Njr(e3) =
 2 0 0 0
0 0 2 0

Njr(e4) =
 2 0 0 0
0 0 2 0

The new centroids become:
c1: P
+(.) = {2,3,4}, P−(.)={-}, I(.)={1}, J(.)={-};
c2: P
+(.) = {-}, P−(.)={1,2}, I(.)={3,4}, J(.)={-};
• Being the centroids different from the initial one, a new iteration of the al-
gorithm is needed. After having calculating the new distances and the new
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centroids, the clusters become:
C1= {1, 2}
C2= {3, 4}
After updating the centroids: The new centroids become:
c1: P
+(.) = {2,3,4}, P−(.)={1}, I(.)={-}, J(.)={-};
c2: P
+(.) = {-}, P−(.)={1,2}, I(.)={3,4}, J(.)={-};
If we calculate the distances between alternatives and new centroids, the as-
signment to the clusters does not change so the algorithm is stopped.
4.4.4 Dynamical aspects
In the algorithm presented in the preceding sections, each observation, x(ti) is consid-
ered in itself, as a point in a multidimensional space, without any particular reference
to its position in the time scale. The fact that x(ti) and x(ti+1) describe events which
happened one immediately after the other is immaterial for the algorithm. That may
lead to serious problems in the interpretation of the data. Take for instance a case
in which during four consecutive weeks I have registered the following numbers for
the casualties due to violent clashes: 2, 0, 5, 1. From these data I cannot draw the
conclusion that the second week belongs to a phase of non-violent dispute, while the
third to a limited violence phase. Should I decide to use the month as the unit of
time, I would report 8 casualties due to clashes for that month. The fact is that
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most of phenomena I am concerned with tend to be quite variable over time, and I
have to find a way to discount such variability. It is important to remark that the
MCC algorithm is coherent with the concept of cycle of conflict: some phases, which
in our terminology means clusters, can appear more than once during the time span.
Smoothing avoids that consecutive points in time bring to consecutive and sudden
changes in clusters but allow for events disconnected in time to be part of the same
cluster: if n = 12 and points 1 and 12 belong to the same cluster, it means that
january and december have been in the same phases. This kind of problem can be
dealt with by means of smoothing techniques; this approach will be discussed in the
following section 4.4.5. Another problem connected with time variability is that the
fact that during a given month I have observed, let’s say, 5 violent clashes have a
different meaning whether these are the first clashes after a long period of calm or
whether a similar or even higher number of clashes has been the rule in the preceding
months. That is I am interested non only in the point values of variables, but also
in the behavior of the variables over time, whether such behavior correspond to a
pattern of increasing, decreasing or stable values. This problem will be dealt with in
section 4.4.6
4.4.5 Smoothing over time
As said before, one of the problems we face in the application of the algorithm in real
cases is the variability of the data. This difficulty can be somehow overcome if we
replace the single individual observations by sliding averages. That means replacing,
for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, x(ti) by
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x¯(ti) =

∑i+s
j=0
x(tj)
i+s
, if i ≤ s ;
∑n
j=i−s
x(tj)
n−(i+s) , if i > s and i > n− s;
∑i+s
j=i−s
x(tj)
2s
, if i > s and i ≤ n− s.
where s is a properly chosen integer and n  s and in any-case n > 2s. Clearly
when i ≤ s, the sum starts at j = 0, and similarly when i ≥ n − s, the sum ends
at n. That means that I smooth the data considering for each point in time not the
values of the variables at that point but an average over an interval centered in that
point and containing 2s+ 1 consecutive points. That allow us not to give too much
importance to sudden and casual variations of some of the variables. Of course the
choice of s is crucial. A too large value for s might lead to a loss of information
and to a reduced capability of discriminating among phases. On the other side too
small values might lead to the impossibility of determining meaningful clusters of
observations.
A different type of smoothing technique is the so called Exponential Smoothing.
In this technique the parameter s is pushed to +∞, ideally assuming to have an
infinite number of observations. The average is weighted by using weights α(1−α)i,
i = 0, 1, . . . , with 0 < α < 1. Being6
∞∑
k=0
(1− α)k = 1
α
(4.8)
the weights add up to 1.
6It is a geometric series.
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Then, I can write:
x¯(ti+1;α) = α
∞∑
k=0
(1− α)kx(ti−k)
= αx(ti + α
∞∑
k=1
(1− α)kx(ti−k)
= αx(ti + (1− α)α
∞∑
k=0
(1− α)kx(ti−k−1)
= αx(ti) + (1− α)x¯(ti;α).
and:
x¯(ti+1;α) = x¯(ti;α)− α(x¯(ti;α)− x(ti)). (4.9)
From (4.9) I have that in practice I do not need to perform averages, but each new
value is computed starting from the preceding one and from the value of the last
observation. The parameter α plays the same role played by s in the sliding average
formula. Higher values of α (α near to 1) correspond to weighting more the most
recent observations, while small values of α (α near to 0) correspond to weighting in
a more even way all the observations.
One important difference between sliding average and exponential smoothing is that
the former makes use of data corresponding to points in time both preceding and
following the one under consideration, while the latter makes use only of preceding
data. That makes the former more suitable for retrospective types of analysis and
the latter to prospective ones.
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4.4.6 Dynamic behavior of the data
For most of the variables I consider in our analysis what is relevant is not only
their value, but also their behavior over time. That can be taken into account if I
consider for each point in time, for each variable, both its value and the value of its
derivative.
Let xk(t1), xk(t2), ..., xk(ti),..., be the values of a given variable (the k
th component
of vector x(t)), and consider the variations over time δx(t2), δx(t3), ..., δx(ti),...,
with:
δk(ti) = xk(ti)− xk(ti−1), i = 1, 2, . . . . (4.10)
Applying exponential smoothing formula (4.9), I can get the values x¯k(ti;α) and
δ¯k(ti;α), from which I can derive the new variables
dk(ti;α) =
δ¯k(ti;α)
x¯k(ti;α)
. (4.11)
Note that dk(ti;α) can be considered as an estimate of the normalized value of the
derivative of x(t). Normalization, obtained by dividing the estimate of the derivative
by the smoothed value of the variable value, is needed because I am interested in the
relative or percentage increments in the variable values rather then in the absolute
value of the increments.
4.4.7 Application to the Nepal case
I have applied the algorithm to the Nepal situation between January 2003 and July
2004. I have built our data-input utilizing both event-data collected by FAST and
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an extraction of Nepal data from the King (2003) dataset7. From the event data I
have extracted some information and I have built indicators to be used as criteria as
for instance “the number of death caused by the military force”, “the demonstrative
actions”, “the number of violent actions done by the rebels”. . . .
Along with dynamic information, I have also included some structural information
regarding economical, demographical, social aspects (GDP, literacy, growth rate).
Since I have used a little interval of time (one year and a half), structural information
had not an impact in the analysis because of their slow change in time, but I am
intentioned to use them for future studies because of their importance. The interval
of time has been divided in 38 points each representing the aggregation of data for
15 days.
In figure 4.6 the data on Nepal have been aggregated every 15 days considering only
the IDEA scale value that is associated to a single event data. All the events have
been taken into account: both peaceful and conflictual events.
From the graph I can individuate an early period (from 1 to 13, that is from January
2003 to July 2003) of some stability followed by an escalation of instability, and in the
reality on January 2003 the Nepal government and Maoist rebels declared immediate
ceasefire, which did last till the end of August 2003, after this date the instability of
Nepal has been growing ever and ever.
In figure 4.7 the MCC algorithm is compared with IDEA scale. In the graph, 4
clusters numbered from 1 to 4 are present and they represent the stability of the
7The King dataset originally contains almost 10 million individual events, each coded to the
exact day they occur or become known. The data are about 450 countries and include 200 types
of actions. The data are coded by computer from millions of Reuters news reports. The software
system that performs this task is, as for FAST, produced by VRA. (see appendix B).
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Figure 4.6: The situation in Nepal as described just from the aggregation of IDEA
scale values.
Figure 4.7: MCC algorithm compared to IDEA values
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country (cluster number 4 is associated with relative higher stability than cluster
number 1) (k = 4 is chosen apriori and represent the number of phases). The results
given by the MCC-algorithm are coherent with the real situation. 29th of January
2003 (between point 2 and 3 in the graph) Nepal government, Maoist rebels declare
immediate ceasefire: from a cluster of level 3 (partial stability) the situation pass to
a cluster more “calm”. This passage do not come immediately but with a little delay.
This could be given to a factor similar to the phenomenon of adaptation of section
2.2.1. 27th of August 2003 (point 16) Nepal’s 7-month ceasefire collapses after peace
talks fail to make progress: from cluster 4 to cluster 3 and then to cluster 2 for
an escalation of instability. 29th of september 2003: Nepal’s Maoist rebels declare
9-day ceasefire, starting Oct. 2 (point 19), in this case, there is no change in cluster
and this is due to the fact that 9 days of ceasefire are aggregated in a single point
in the graph and the smoothing applied to the data tend to smooth outliers. The
same can be said of point 20 which has an high value of IDEA scale because on 11th
of October 2003 35 Maoist rebels were killed in attack by Nepalese police, ending
9-day ceasefire, but that does not influence the MCC algorithm. On 12th of february
2004 several protest against the King begin: between point 27 and 29 thousands
of Nepalese students protest King Gyanendra’s continuing use of executive powers
and tens of thousands of Nepalese citizens demonstrate against King Gyanendra in
Kathmandu (1st of march 2004).
4.4.8 Comparison with Schrodt LML-Algorithm
I have done a comparison with the LML algorithm described in section 3.3. As I
already said, the basic assumption in this approach is that within each conflict phase
there is a relative stability of the interactions among the different actors, while sudden
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changes happens in the transition from one phase to the next. The objective is then
to detect those critical patterns of event flows which characterize the transitions from
one phase to another using the stability LML measure.
Figure 4.8: Application of LML > ∆ clustering algorithm to Nepal situation. The
horizontal lines are two different values for the threshold ∆.
In order to detect such patterns, the different actors are considered and for each pair
of actors, a dyad, the different events involving them, are aggregated in one single
value, using some aggregating technique, such as the Goldstein scale or the IDEA
scale. I have run the LML algorithm on our data in order to make a comparison.
The LML algorithm applied to our dataset is shown in figure 4.8 while a comparison
with MCC algorithm is done on figure 4.9. Through the study of the points in which
4.5. CONCLUSIONS 113
the graph passes over the horizontal line representing the threshold ∆, it is possible
to catch the points in time in which there is a change from one phase to another
and compare them with our apriori knowledge of the situation. The choice of the
threshold is very important, as I can see from the graph. In fact, if I choose an
high value of ∆ (130 in the graph), few change are discovered, while with a smaller
value(30) I can find a similar trend to the results of MCC algorithm.
Figure 4.9: Comparison between MCC algorithm and LML > ∆ clustering algorithm
on Nepal data. The horizontal line is the threshold ∆ which determines the chances
in clusters for LML algorithm.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have analyzed the possibility of applying the Multicriteria Clustering
Algorithm to conflict situations. I have presented the algorithm and underlined some
important aspects to take into account like the dynamical aspects of the data. Some
results have also been shown making comparison with LML algorithm proposed by
Schrodt (section 3.3). The Clustering techniques used in the past have been limited
by the necessity of aggregating data. Multicriteria has the advantage of requiring
no aggregation and it can handle with both quantitative and qualitative data. For
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this reason also in the Risk Assessment problem, it is reasonable to think of applying
the multicriteria algorithm described in section 4.4. In this case, variables, criteria
profiles and output assume different meanings. The vector x(ti) is no more a point
in time but a state, lets call it from now on xi. The elements of each point in time
are the values at that time of all the criteria that are deemed relevant with respect
to the risk level evaluation. Such variables can be macro level variables which vary
slowly over time, such that population, income per capita, inequality indices like
the Gini one, literacy index, . . . , or variables representing events which may change
more rapidly over time, such as the monthly number of violent confrontation, the
number of casualities in violent clashes during the past year, . . . . I can allow also for
qualitative variables such as the level of freedom of the media (high, medium, low,
poor), or the level of respect of the rights of minorities. If m is the total number
of the variables, I have that xi = (xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,m), for all i. Also in this case the
vectors xi can be somehow ranked, although the ranking might not be a total order,
and the profiles P (xi)= {P+(xi), P−(xi), I(xi), J(xi)}, are built.
P+(xi) = {xj : xiP+xj, j = 1, 2, . . . , n}
P−(xi) = {xj : xjP−xi, j = 1, 2, . . . , n}
I(xi) = {xj : xiIxj, j = 1, 2, . . . , n}
J(xi) = {xj : xiJxj, j = 1, 2, . . . , n}
The algorithm proposed by Smet and Guzma´n (2004), with these new inputs, evolves
computationally in the same way and iterates until a stable assignment is found,
that is one that does not lead to further changes in the centroids. It partitions
the set of data in q subsets or clusters, C1, C2, . . . , Cq, which can be ranked from
the one containing the less risky states to the one containing the states with higher
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failure/conflict risk. In the case of risk/no risk or MID/no MID ecc.. I would have
q = 2. Lets remember that in this approach I do not need to know in advance
the characteristics of the clusters; such characteristics are in fact the result of the
algorithm. At the end, each cluster, Cj, will be represented by a centroid, cj with a
profile P (cj). The centroid does not need to be one of the elements in the original data
set, and is defined as that element which minimizes the sum of the distances from all
the elements in Cj. The centroids can be studied also for understanding which are the
values of the critical variables that are at the basis of each class of risk. Interesting
aspects of an approach of this type is that all the different criteria/variables are
maintained separate during the computation, and that the classification is based on
the real data and not on some a priori definition of which variable values define a
stable state or a failed one. These considerations are mainly qualitative because the
algorithm has been tested on a limited amount of data and only the case of conflict
phase analysis has been considered. Moreover, the calibration of the parameters
is a critical point still to be studied: thresholds and weights should be assigned
after a consultation with decision makers (direct elicitation techniques) or through
techniques, like DIVAPME(Mousseau, 1995) and SRF (Figueira and Roy, 2002), that
determine the vector of the coefficients from pairwise comparisons of fictitious actions
or a relative importance ranking of criteria (direct elicitation techniques). After a
consultation with political scientists, I have acquired knowledge on the importance
of some indicators and variables over others (it is the case of environmental stresses)
but I had no possibility of comparing my insights on the values of the thresholds
with researchers with political interest.
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Chapter 5
Risk Assessment
5.1 Introduction
Another fundamental question in the conflict field is whether the country under
analysis is a country at risk or not, and if it is at risk, which kind of risk (low, serious,
MID, state failure..) or if and which kind of negotiation or mediation attempts can
be effective given a certain crisis. Analysis leading to answer to these questions
go usually under the name of “Risk Assessment”1. Risk Assessment models are
often based only on structural factors, with the aim of finding where and how to
act in order to prevent the outbreak of a crisis or to correctly intervene with the
right type of mediation or negotiation. The objective is very different from the one
of the Conflict phases analysis, in fact in that case the use of hundreds of data
collected every day allows to make predictions in the very short term, while in the
Risk assessment case, the use of structural data avoids the possiblity of making short
1see http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/risk.htm and Gurr and Marshall (2000)
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term dynamic insights and any considerations on possible future behaviors have to be
made on the long term. One of the principal examples in the field is the State Failure
Task Project that involves statistical methods for studying those countries at risk of
political instability (section 5.2). Along with classical statistical approaches, in the
last years several projects have begun to use Machine Learning techniques (Schrodt
(1991)) for finding structures possibly hidden in a conflict dataset. Neural Networks,
for example, have been applied to the state failure dataset and have contributed to
the development of the project (section 5.3.1). Other applications of neural networks
can be found for predicting Military Interstate Disputes (MIDs) (section 5.3.1) and
for studying negotiation purposes (section 5.3.1). A first attempt of using recurrent
artificial neural network (RANN) to the conflict field has also been done (section
5.3.1). Other machine learning approaches like Decision trees, Rule Learning are
used for discovering hidden patterns which allow to separate in the observations
space those points which correspond to conflict situations from those which do not
or for better understanding the possible outcome of a negotiation process (section
5.3.2)
Machine learning methods are trainable systems that can ”learn” to solve complex
problems from a set of examples and generalize the “acquired knowledge” to solve
unknown problems. There are several possible criteria for evaluating a learning
algorithm:
• Predictive accuracy of classifier
• Speed of learner
• Speed of classifier
• Space requirements
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The predictive accuracy of the classifier is the most common and it measures the
proportion of correctly classified instances:
Accuracy =
TC + TP
TC + TP + FC + FP
(5.1)
where true conflict (TC) denote the correct classifications of conflict examples; true
peace (TP) are the correct classifications of peace examples; false peace (FP) repre-
sent the incorrect classification of conflict examples into the peace class (false posi-
tives); and false conflict (FC) are the peace examples incorrectly classified into the
conflict class (false negative). Conflict predictive value (CPV), is the reliability of
conflict predictions of the classifier and is computed by:
CPV =
TC
TC + FC
(5.2)
Sensitivity (Sn) measures the fraction of actual positive examples that are correctly
classified:
Sn =
TC
TC + FP
(5.3)
while specificity (Sp) measures the fraction of actual negative examples that are
correctly classified:
Sp =
TP
TP + FC
(5.4)
The methods I will describe in the next section use the Sensitivity (Sn) for evaluating
their performance. The problem is that it is often calculated the accuracy of the
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method more than the accuracy of the answers given by it. In those projects with the
aim of discriminating between two classes, conflict or no conflict, (MID or no MID;
mediation success or mediation failure etc...), the percentage presented as accuracy
represent the probability that a certain item r ( a generic row in the dataset) is
classified as a conflict or not. The interest is indeed in calculating the discriminant
power, the effective capacity of distinguishing the class of conflict cases (A) from the
one of peace cases (B):
given an item r, classified as a conflict, with which probability I can say that r is
really a conflict case? Answering to this question could give a correct evaluation of the
effectiveness of the classification. I have performed a very simple analysis applying
the Bayes Theorem to some of the existing projects in the following way:
r: the item under consideration
A : set of items recognized as war cases
W : event that r be a war case
fA|W : fraction of war cases which have been assigned to A
fA|P : fraction of peace cases which have been assigned to A
NW : number of war cases
NP : number of peace cases
N = NW +NP : total number of items
P [X]: the marginal probability of the event X
Apriori probability that r be a war case:
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P [W ] =
NW
N
(5.5)
Apriori probability that r be assigned to A:
P [A] =
NW
N
fA|W +
NP
N
fA|P (5.6)
(P [A] is given by the correct classification of conflict cases and by the wrong classi-
fication of no-conflict (peace) cases)
Applying Bayes Theorem I get the aposteriori probability that r which has been
assigned to A is really a war case:
P [W |A] = P [A|W ]P [W ]
P [A]
=
fA|W NWN
NW
N
fA|W + NPN fA|P
=
1
1 + NP
NW
fA|P
fA|W
(5.7)
When possible, I will apply the Bayes theorem to the methods of the next sections.
When this analysis is not performed, the results as reported in the original contri-
bution by the authors are reported. In some cases I was not able to understand if
the accuracy has been calculated via Sensitivity which from now on will be called
simply accuracy. After describing some existing approaches I will present in the next
chapter another technique which, at the best of our knowledge, has not been used so
far for Risk Assessment analysis. This technique is based on Logic Functions. Logic
functions allow to separate the points corresponding to situation of probable conflict
from the others, as the other techniques do, in addition, more than the other tech-
niques, they make possible to find significant casual relations, so making easier to
discover the variables on which an intervention may be more effective in preventing
the conflict outbreak.
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5.2 State Failure Project
The large-scale unclassified U.S. government effort at quantitative political forecast-
ing in comparative politics, the State Failure project2 is an example of structural
approach whose aim is to identify measurable characteristics of those countries at
risk of serious political instability and for discriminating whether a country is at risk
of experiencing a state failure or not (Esty et al. (1995) and Esty et al. (1998)). The
State Failure Task Force3 takes advantage of a huge amount of data coming from
different sources like the World Bank, United Nations, US Census Bureau and other
organization. Data produced by the Task Force itself are also used: as shown in
fig. 5.1, the project has systematically identified all the episodes of different kinds of
state failure, “revolutionary wars (62 episodes)”, “ethnic wars (74)”, “genocides and
politicide (40)” and “adverse or disruptive regime transitions (111)”, for a total of
287 episodes, between 1955 and 2003 for independent states with a population of at
least 500,0004.
Many of the 287 episodes occurred in complex combinations: a country could have
2State failure is a label that include a range of severe political conflicts and regime crises exem-
plified by events of the 1990s in Somalia, Bosnia, Liberia, Afghanistan and Congo-Kinshasa
3The State Failure Task Force is “..a group formed in response to a request from se-
nior US policymakers to identify factors associated with serious internal political crises.” See
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/
4Revolutionary wars and ethnic wars involve at least 1,000 battle-related deaths due to conflict
between organized challengers and government authorities; adverse regime changes involve abrupt
turns from a more democratic system to one that is more authoritarian, revolutionary changes in
political elites, or total or near-total collapses of central state authority; genocides and politicides
involve government targeting of specific communal or political groups for destruction, with no
precise death thresholds.
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(b) Incidence and Prevalence of Political Instability Worldwide, 1955-
2003
Figure 5.1: Episodes of different kinds of state failure as identified by the Task Force
Project
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experienced in the same period different kind of state failures. For example, the 1994
genocide in Rwanda was preceded by a revolutionary challenge by invading Tutsi ex-
iles that begun in 1990 and by an abortive 1991 regime transition toward democratic
power sharing by Hutus and Tutsis. Rwanda would then be inserted in both the
adverse regime changes category, revolutionary wars and genocide. These complex
situation have thus been studied in order to have a unique category of consolidated
episodes of instability : if two or more events occurred in the same country without
an intervening period of at least 5 years of stability (defined as five years with no new
event onsets and no continuing events), those events were “consolidated” into a single
episode of instability with a single onset date as the mark from stability to instability:
when the 287 case were consolidated only 141 State Failure were numbered.
The dependent variable is the onset of an episode of political instability. The project
has then evaluated empirically the correlation between these episodes and some 1300
possible causal variables: political, demographic, economic, and environmental vari-
ables have been used. Examples of these variables are infant mortality rate, popula-
tion size, population density, number of border states with major civil conflict, trade
openness, type of regime...
This analysis has allowed to identify a handful of structural variables that increase
the likelihood of state failure of all types. Not all of the variables are however used
in each context. For example, the model of ethnic wars most likely cannot be used in
a genocide situation: there is the need to discriminate the various cases, being able
to recognize the critical variables. For each country in the database, it is present
a list of state-failure events with the starting and ending dates, the type of event
(revolution, regime transition, ethnic..) and a brief historical description for each
event. In order to make the model useful for predictions, the cases of instability
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onset are profiled from two year before the real onset: in this way, the analysis allow
to understand if, given the current conditions, the state will experience a state failure
two years hence. The problem of conflict and political instability involves extremely
rare events: on average, of the 150 countries with a population larger than 500,000,
only two or three instability onset events were found for every given year. Of the
whole dataset composed of roughly 7500 country-year observations, less than 2%
included an onset of instability. The analysis of the episodes is based on case-control
method which is a technique commonly used for the analysis of the risk factor for
rare diseases such as cancer5: the list of contry-year episodes of political instability
onsets is matched with several control cases that are chosen at random from those
countries that have not experienced instability events for at least a period of seven
year (if the instability episode is related to the year 1976 then the control cases, in
order to be chosen for the analysis need to have not experienced an instability event
between the period 1974-1980).
Logistic Regression
The Task Force project uses two main analytic methods for identifying the factors
associated with a higher risk of instability onset comparing the instability cases and
the control cases: the first is logistic regression model which is a variation of ordinary
statistical regression, useful when the observed outcome is restricted to two values,
5The basic strategy of a case-control study is to compare a group which has a particular out-
come of interest with a control group that does not have that outcome but often matches the first
group with respect to selected characteristics. Case-control methods are used to study rare dis-
eases because the methods are quite efficient with respect to sample size in comparison with other
approaches.
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which usually represent the occurrence or non-occurrence of some outcome event
(usually coded as 1 and 0, respectively ). In the state failure project, the outcome
variable is the onset of a state failure or not: this variable can be modeled with a
Bernoulli probability distribution, that is, the outcome variable Y takes on the value
Y = 1 with probability pi and Y = 0 with probability 1−pi, where 0 means no failure
and 1 means failure. The two category are mutually exclusive and exaustive. The
interest is in finding what is the probability of failure pi for every combination of
values of the independent variables x.
In logistic regression pi has the form of the logistic function:
Figure 5.2: Logistic function
5.2. STATE FAILURE PROJECT 127
pi = 1/(1 + e−α−xβ). (5.8)
which is shown in fig. 5.2, where horizontally we have x and vertically pi. The slope
of the curve are determined by the values of the parameters α and β.
Logistic regression analysis is about finding the parameters that best fit the data.
Logistic techniques do not say anything on how to select which variables should be
included in the model: several approaches are thus used to identify small sets of
variables that closely fit the empirical data like for instance stepwise regression, in
which the variables are added sequentially trying to take the ones with the best
explanatory power.
Neural Networks
The second method is based on neural network analysis where cluster of independent
variables are used as training for finding the model that better predicts instability.
Figure 5.3 shows a general neural network scheme. The network has multiple “layers”
of neurons. The input layer is activated by the values of the independent variables of
the problem to be solved. The input layer values in turn activate the hidden layer,
and the hidden layer activates the output layer (forward propagation). The state of
each neuron is determined by the weighted sum of the values of the neurons to which
it is connected: if Ni is connected to a set of neurons, through a set of weights wji
then the state of Ni is determined by
Ni = f(
∑
j
Njwji) (5.9)
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150 Patterns, Rules and Learning
Ni = F(!
j
 Njwji ) (5.1)
where F is some function, usually nonlinear and monotonic.
This mathematical structure is a simple approximation to the mechanism through
which biological neurons—the basic cells of the brain and the nervous system—operate.
Biological neurons are interconnected by long branching dendrites; the activity of one
neuron may either excite another neuron or inhibit it.  In a neural network, excitatory
connections correspond to positive weights; inhibitory connections to negative weights.
While mental activity is more complex than the simple activity or inactivity of
neurons—for example it is mediated by a vast array of neurochemicals that influence the
transmission of signals—the process of neural stimulation and inhibition is clearly an
important aspect of the brain physiology.
Figure 5.6 shows a schematic of a typical neural network.  The network has
multiple “layers” of neurons.  The input layer is activated by the values of the
independent variables of the problem to be solved.  The input layer values in turn activate
the hidden layer according to equation 5.1, and the hidden layer activates the output
layer.  For example, a neural network designed to identify letters of the alphabet might
contain an input layer determined by a grid of nine boxes placed over the letter.  Each
box would control four input neurons—giving a total of 36 neurons in the input
layer—that would be activated if the box contained a horizontal, vertical, right diagonal
or left diagonal line, as illustrated in Figure 5.7.  The output layer would consist of 26
neurons, each corresponding to a letter of the alphabet.
  !
Figure 5.6.  Neural Network Schematic
In the example in Figure 5.7, the inputs are binary.  This configuration is useful
when dealing with nominal or categorical data, since their values can always be
expressed as a binary string.  If the network is working with interval-level measures—for
example economic data or a physical process such as a control of a pipeline—neurons
could be set to real numbers and Equation 5.1 applied, or the binary and real-valued
inputs could be mixed in the same network.
Figure 5.3: Neural Ne work st ucture
The weights are the knowledge representation structure of the neural network and
the performance of the network is determined by their values. Since a neural network
contains a large number of weights, their values cannot be determined analytically
except in the most simple problems. Instead, the weights are randomly initialized
and the neural network is trained by examples. Starting from cases for which the
values of the desired state of the output layer is known, the weights are adjusted in
order to have the minimum difference between the actual state of the output layer
and the desired one. The adjustment continue until the weights are stabilized.
In the logistic regression techniques, the form of the equation that relates the in-
dependent variables to the outcome of interest is pre-selected. Neural networks, by
contrast, allow researchers to infer the particular form of the model’s equation from
the information implicit in large numbers of examples. One advantage of neural net-
works over logistic regression is that they are able to process cases with incomplete
input data, but, according to the task force, even if they have a better capability for
working with more complex non-linear issues, they have not reached better results,
and the independent variables with major explanatory power have been identified
through relatively simple regression models. The Task Force primarily uses neural
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networks to explore the possibility that the logistic regression techniques described
above are overlooking important variables or mis-specifying the relationship between
particular independent variables and the risk of state failure (see section 5.3 for an
accurate description of the use of neural networks in the state failure project and,
more in general, in conflict analysis).
The State failure project defined different models for different regions. I was not able
to apply the Bayes theorem to the state failure project because I could not fill all
the information required for eq. 5.7, I thus show the results on accuracy as reported
in the original work. According to an analysis based on 117 onset of instability and
three random control sets, each with 351 stability cases (for a total of 351*3+117 =
1,170), the simple model used (called “Global model”)6, constructed without com-
plex interaction terms and with few nonlinearities, has an accuracy more of 70% in
distinguishing countries that experienced instability two years hence from those that
remained stable (in a model built for the specific region of Sub-Saharan Africa, the
region with most episodes since 1955, the accuracy reaches the 80%).
6The Global model has only 4 independent variables: regime type, infant mortality, a “bad
neighborhood” indicator that recognize cases with four or more bordering states embroiled in armed
civil or ethnic conflict, and the presence or absence of state-led discrimination. This analysis have
been done in 2005, the original model developed in 1995 had 3 independent variables: democracy,
trade openness and infant mortality and an accuracy of 66%.
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5.3 Risk Assessment trough Learning Systems
5.3.1 Neural Networks
Neural Networks for predicting Military Interstate Diputes
Lagazio and Russett (2003) utilized a multi-layer neural network for the analysis of
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID)7.
As for the state failure example, the dependent variable outcome can take the value
0/1 which in this case means MID occurrence or not. The analysis is performed on
the dataset of Russett and Oneal (2001a) which regards the politically relevant dyads
(PRDs)8 for the period 1885-1992 where the unit is dyad-year. Since neural networks
can have problems with classifying rare events, the authors avoid the problem of
overfitting9 through the use of cross validation which is a method that partition a
sample of data into subsets such that the analysis is initially performed on a single
subset, while the other subset(s) are retained for subsequent use in confirming and
7MIDs are conflicts between states that do not involve a full scale war. In particular a conflict
is described as MID if it causes fewer than 1000 deaths, and some military force is used.
8The politically relevant dyads are pairs of essentially contiguous states or with at least one
major power.
9When fitting a model to noisy data, it is made the assumption that the data have been generated
from some “true” model by making predictions at given values of the inputs, then adding some
amount of noise to each point, where the noise is drawn from a normal distribution with an unknown
variance. The task is to discover both this model and the width of the noise distribution. Overfitting
happen when the model fits the data points too closely, fitting the noise rather than trying to capture
the true distribution. The higher are the number of parameters in a model, the more complexly
the model can fit the data. If the number of parameters in the model is larger than that the “true
one”, then there is the risk of overfitting.
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validating the initial analysis. The authors made several tests with different size of
the dataset and compared situations of balanced training set (same numbers of cases
with MID=0 and with MID=1) with unbalanced training set: since neural networks
are less sensitive to outliers, if an unbalanced training is used, the incidence of conflict
cases (which represent the minority) does not produce great changes in the internal
structure of the network. The best choice is thus to have a balanced set of data.
The neural network structure is shown in figure 5.4. They have used a network with
three layer: input, hidden and output. The first two have 8 units10 while the output
has two units (conflict, no conflict).
Figure 5.4: The structure of neural networks used by Lagazio and Russett (2003)
The causal structure of a neural network is complex to be analyzed due to the great
number of parameters (weights) that link the input to the output. Moreover, the
relationships among variables are often nonlinear and nonmonotonic thus making
difficult to understand the contribution of each variable and their dependencies. The
authors have tried to study the impact of each variable on the network and they
10Since the independent variables used here as inputs are almost the same as the ones I utilize
with Logic Function, I remand the reader to section 6.4 for their explanation.
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utilized three measures for interpreting the model: an estimate of the relative overall
influence of each variable on the output (GI), the degree to which the inputs con-
tributes to the output (SI) and a measure of the dependencies across input variables
(RF). This analysis has been used for testing some hypotheses that derive for in-
stance from the liberal thesis (that put economic interdependence and democracy as
the main factors affecting dyads relationships) or the Kantian peace (Kant (1927))
(that sees IGO, democracy and trade as critical factors in conflict situation).
Marwala et al. (2006) developed a Bayesian neural network for classifying Military
Interstate disputes. In the Bayesian approach to neural network learning, uncer-
tainty about the relationship between inputs and outputs is initially taken care of
by an assumed prior distribution of parameters (weights and biases). This prior dis-
tribution is updated to posterior distribution using a likelihood function following
Bayes’ theorem while data are observed. The posterior distribution for the model
parameters given the observed data is found by combining the prior distribution with
the likelihood f the data when the parameters are given:
P (parameters|data) = P (parameters)P (data|parameters)
P (data)
(5.10)
The training of a Bayesian neural network is about calculating the P (parameters|data)
of eq. 5.10. For the estimation of the parameters two approaches are considered: the
Gaussian Approximation (it is assumed that the posterior probabilities can be ap-
proximated by a Gaussian distribution)(MacKay, 1991) and the Hybrid Monte Carlo
method (Neal, 1992). The latter is a variant of the classic Monte Carlo method and
avoids random walk by using the gradient of the neural network error thus ensuring
that the simulation samples in regions of higher probabilities. It performed better
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than the Gaussian Approximation because it reduces the false positive ( cases of
MID classified as peace). The same dataset as Lagazio and Russett (2003) is con-
sidered but only for the period 1946-1992 and, coherently with them, the training
is done on a balanced dataset and the testing on an unbalanced one. It is not re-
quired a validation of the training set because the nature of Bayesian neural network
avoids overfitting by integrating over the posterior distribution of the network rather
than choosing a single “optimal” set of parameters (Neal, 1996). The variables used
are seven: Democracy, Allies, Contingency, Distance, Capability Ratio, Dependency,
Major Power (they do not consider the number of IGOs as Lagazio and Russet do).
The authors have made a deep analysis on the impact of each variable on MID: they
have used the automatic relevance determination (ARD) method, one of the most
successful Bayesian methods for feature selection and sparse learning. ARD finds the
relevance of features by optimizing the model marginal likelihood, also known as the
evidence (P (data) in eq. 5.10). This analysis has confirmed the results of the liberal
peace but has also produced some new insights, for instance on the strong interaction
between democracy, relationships between countries power (demographic, industrial,
and military), economic dependence and allies. Finally they applied control system
theory to conflict resolution field. The aim is to identify the set of variables that
can be controlled for achieving the goal of maximizing the occurrence of peace while
minimizing conflicts. For doing this, the neural network is followed by an optimizer
that become active only when the output of the network is a conflict: in this case
it identifies the critical variables to be controlled. Experiments were performed for
both controlling one variable at time and a set of variables simultaneously. In the
first case the nonlinear function minimization method used was the golden section
search method while for controlling a set of variables, simulated annealing was con-
sidered (Kolda et al., 2003). In both analysis, democracy and economic dependance
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have discovered as the key variables to be controlled when the goal is peace.
The accuracy of model, as calculated by the authors reaches 73% of correct MID clas-
sification and 74% of correct no-MID classification, in fact Marwala et al. (2006) use
a training set of 500 cases of conflict (MID=1) and 500 cases of no-conflict (MID=0),
and a testing set with 392 cases of conflict (NW ) and 26345 of no-conflict (NP ): the
neural network recognizes correctly 286 cases over the 392 (73%, fA|W ) and 19494
of the 26345 (74%). Applying the eq. 5.7 I reach an efficiency of 3.8%. Considering
that if I calculate the probability of having a conflict just dividing the number of
conflict items (892) over the total cases (27737) I obtain 3.2%, it brings not great
progresses. Applying Bayes to Lagazio and Russett (2003) the efficiency is slightly
better: 5,4%, which is very low but better than the 3.2% (82% of militarized conflict
and 72% of the non military disputes while testing the data for the period 1946-1992
according to the original paper). I will see in the following chapter that the appli-
cation of Logic Functions reaches an efficiency of about 8%, which is still very low
although slightly better.
Neural Networks and State failure
King and Zeng (2001) have used neural networks for improving the state failure
project: in particular, they identified and corrected several methodological errors
of the project and then showed how the use of neural networks can improve the
capability of forecasting events of state failures (see also Beck et al. (2000)). They
expanded the range of explanatory variables from three to seven11: trade openess,
11They refer to the original model developed in 1998 (see footnote number 8), the “global model”
(2004) I have talked about previously is the evolution of the state failure task project and take in
consideration also the improvement of King and Zeng of 2001
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infant mortality, democracy (split in two variables: full and partial democracy), mili-
tary population, population density and legislative effectiveness. They used quite the
same dataset as the State failure project12 and they have divided the observed sample
in two parts: data from 1955 to 1990 for training the network and data from 1991 to
1998 for testing it. Their goal, in additional to forecasting, was to identify regulari-
ties that can help to build theories rather than to test existing ones. The choice of
using neural network over logit models, according to the authors, is given by the fact
that international conflict situation involves strong-non linearities and interactions
between variables, and the assumption of taking them as absent (as task force does)
is wrong (Russett and Oneal, 2001b). The neural network used by the authors, as
logistic regression, specify a parametric family of curves and then choose the values
of the parameters so that the network better fit the data. The difference is that eq
5.8 is a curve that represents an escalator (an s-curve where s is for sigmoid) while
neural networks allow for different types of curve like escalators, roller coaster, linear,
quadratic, cubic etc... In this way the non linear nature of conflict can be taken into
consideration. If I write eq. 5.8 as pi = logit(α+ xβ) or pi = logit(linear(x)) then
the mathematical form of the neural network used by King and Zeng is the following:
pii = logit(linear(logit(linear(Xi)))) (5.11)
where Xi = 1, X1i, X2,i, ...Xk,1 is the vector of k explanatory variables plus a constant
and linear(Xi) = Xiβ = β0 + β1X1i + ... + βkXki. The parameters (that are inside
linear(Xi)) can be estimated from the data with a maximum likelihood procedure
12In reality, the state failure dataset discharged those entry with missing data and, according to
King and Zeng, given that the failures are rare events, this discharge bring to inefficiency in the
failures forecasting. For this reason they have re-inserted the raws originally discharged.
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as logit. Several comparisons between logit and neural networks have been done
and the results have been in total favor of the second approach. As for the state
failure project, I show the accuracy results as reported in the original work. As
regards forecasting, in the work of 2001, they reached an accuracy on the training
set between 12.5% and 24.6% and 16.5% on the testing set.
Applying the eq. 5.7 I reach an efficiency of 50.2% which is very high in comparison
of 3.8% and 5.4% of the previous section. The reason is that the fraction of TP (true
peace) is 99.2% and thus the network avoids almost entirely the FC (false conflict)
that represent the false negatives. In conflict situation, a model of this kind is not a
reliable one because critical situation derives from FP (false peace) that are the false
positives. Comparison can be done with medical diagnosis: a case that is claimed
as benign when a malignancy is present, represents a critical error (false positive)
while prediction of a malignancy for an actually benign case triggers additional tests,
and thus has not the same relevance as the first error (false negative). Thus, even if
the accuracy calculated via Bayes theorem is high, the model has litte practical and
political relevance.
Corr and Pearlman (2002) have taken as starting point the suggestions of future
research done by King and Zeng and have explored the possibility of improving their
model. In particular, they disaggregated the unique variable “consolidated state
failure” in the four specific failures, revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, genocides and
politicide, adverse or disruptive regime transitions, and they have used neural net-
works for building four new models of state failure, each with a dependent variable
describing one type of failure (the task force have disaggregated the dependent vari-
able for genocide and ethnic wars but never for regime crisis and revolution). Their
results do not differ significantly from the work of King and Zeng, but it is interest-
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ing to note that they had to correct their dataset: in fact, as said previously, King
and Zeng had to re-insert in the state failure dataset those entries with missing data
that were discharged by the task force, the problem is that they had not only filled
in missing values with good observations but also rows that had to be eliminated:
entries from 1955 to 1998 regarding countries of the former Soviet republics which
did not exist until that 1991. Approximately 30% of the dataset has been eliminated!
(of 2000 observations eliminated, only one was a failure).
Neural Networks and Selforganizing maps applied to the Confman database
Dorffner et al. (2006) applied neural networks, in particular the Multilayer Percep-
trons to the Confman database (Bercovitch and Houston (1993)) which is a dataset
containing descriptions of 333 conflicts between 1945 and 2000 and more than 5000
mediation attempts for the same period. The multilayer perceptrons consists of two
layers: the hidden one and the output one. Neural networks have been applied to the
database covering the period 1945-1995 (248 conflicts and 3676 mediation attempts).
One of the goal of the work was to understand if mediation attempts can be classi-
fied in “successful” or “unsuccessful” attempts. Having the description of the conflict
and the properties of the mediation event, is it possible to predict the outcome of a
mediation attempt? This analysis has been done before with linear classifier applied
to prior versions of the Confman database, thus comparisons between the neural
network and the previous techniques have been done. Before applying the model, a
great apriori analysis on the data have been performed. In fact, some attributes of
the Confman database needed to be transformed into numerical ones, those that are
numeric are used directly, the others are transformed into binary attributes (taking
values 0 or 1) and some, redundant or non-informative, are removed. Given the
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complexity of the parameters of neural networks, the minimum number of features
have to be selected in order not to have the number of weights growing too much.
At the same time the features have to be chosen so that the best results are reached.
After the feature selection phase, 5 attributes are chosen: the duration of the conflict,
power of party A13, power of party B, political rights of party B, conflict manage-
ment initiated by both parties. The model has thus one hidden layer (composed of
5 units), 5 input units and one output: the output is the conflict management out-
come which can take the value 1 (success)14 or 0 (failure). For validating the model,
cross validation is performed. The performance of the model, as originally reported
by the authors is 59.4%. Comparing neural network classifier with the linear one,
no statistical significant differences have been found. Another goal of the authors
was to understand if the database could be designed as a two-dimensional map ca-
pable of extracting the intrinsic structure and similarities in the data (clustering).
For doing this they applied Selforganizing Maps approach, which is a clustering and
visualization method. Selforganizing maps combine the k-means clustering with a
topographic scheme so that the clusters in the original high dimensional data space
are mapped into points in a two dimensional plane. Clusters that are similar become
points that are close in the plane. The Confman database for the period 1945-1995
is used. The inputs are the same 5 attributes as for the neural network model and so
for the output (conflict management outcome). Some interesting results have been
found, for instance the variable that tell us if the mediation is initiated by both
13The party is usually a state but can be also for instance an ethnic group within a state.
The power of a party is measured by structural and behavioral components such as resources,
abilities and experience as international actors.
14This variable is the aggregation of other variables that consider the specific outcome of a
mediation attempt like cease fire, partial agreement, full settlement.
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parties is a great discriminant between clusters, also the duration of the conflicts
and the power of the parties contribute to the discrimination. A third goal was to
compare the dataset covering the period 1945-1989 with the one covering the period
1989-2000 in order to understand if the critical year 1989 (considered as the end of
the Cold war) can really be taken as a turning point in pattern recognition that led
to a decisive changes in the nature of conflict. The analysis was performed using
both neural network and selforganizing maps and it considered the same number
and types of features already described previously. Looking at the results, some dif-
ferences have been found: the structure of the clusters is different in the before-1989
cases and in the after-1989 cases which, according to the authors, means that con-
flicts have a different nature and origin in the two cases, also the features that better
discriminate in the after-1989 cases, seems not always to have the same impact on the
before-1989 cases(for instance, power of party A play a smaller role in the after-1989
cases than in the before-1989 cases) Moreover, the conflict management outcome is
more predictable if the after-1989 dataset is used and the neural network approach
present differences with linear classifiers that become statistically significant (it is to
be said that the performance of the classifier is better in the pre-1989 case).
Recurrent Artificial Neural Network
Another model that uses neural networks, and in particular Recurrent Artificial Neu-
ral Networks(RANN), is the one of Martin and Pemstein (2002). In reality, this
project cannot be inserted in Risk Assessment models given the nature of the data
used and the objective of the analysis. In fact, RANN are used for finding nonlinear
structures in the event data generated in real time by the Integrated Data for Event
Analysis (IDEA) project in order of making predictions on the possible evolution of
140 CHAPTER 5. RISK ASSESSMENT
the level of a conflict. The difference between this approach and the others based
on the neural networks, is that the temporal nature of the data is taken into con-
sideration. N actors are considered and they can be either source or targets (see
Appendix B): this gives a total of N(N − 1) directed dyads to study. The aim is to
forecast a multivariate time series of the form {yt}Tt=1, where each observation yt is
a N(N − 1) X 1 vector yt,j→k that represent each directed dyad j → k with j 6= k,
j, k ∈ {1, ..., N}. A one day forecast has the following form:
yT+1 = f(yt,yt−1, ...,y1,xt,xt−1, ...,x1) (5.12)
where the vector xt contain control variables with information at time t on the dyad,
or the nation under analysis.
The difference between RANN and classic neural network is that RANN adds cycles
to the network structure, and these cycles represent a sort of memory. In figure 5.5
Figure 5.5: RANN
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it is shown on the left a simple feed forward network while the other on the right
has an additional connection from the hidden unit to itself. Each time a pattern
is presented, the unit computes its activation just as in a feed forward network.
However its net input now contains a term which reflects the state of the network
(the hidden unit activation) before the pattern was seen. When I present subsequent
patterns, the hidden and output units’ states will be a function of everything the
network has seen so far. The network has a sense of history. Training RANN can
be done using standard methods such as backpropagation or the conjugate gradient
method. The project has not been developed after 2002, at our knowledge, and no
experiments were done by the authors. RANN seems to be inadequate for several
prediction tasks (Chilikuri et al., 1997) but this project is the first attempt of using
event data in a neural network model and can be used for future analysis.
5.3.2 Decision trees, Rule Learning
Decision trees
Druckman et al. (2006) have applied two machine learning methods, Decision trees
and Rule learning, for predicting possible outcomes of negotiation attempts and for
finding those features that better discriminate between various negotiation types.
Negotiations can be distinguished in terms of their objectives such as the ones pro-
posed by Ikle` (Ikle’, 1964) and the possible objectives of an international negotiation
are categorized in what are called Ikle` categories : innovation agreements (dealing
with the construction of new relationships or obligations between the parties), re-
distribution agreements (which are characterized by a demand of an offensive side
for a change in its favor, at the expense of a defensive side), extension agreements
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(which are meant to continue the normal ), normalization agreements (which are
meant to terminate the abnormal or to formalize arrangements tacitly arrived at)
and side effects (effects not concerning negotiations). Twenty years after the original
definition one category have been added, multilateral regime negotiations (in this
analysis multilateral regime negotiations is used over side effects).
In previous analyses, a combination of 16 features concerning aspects of the parties,
situation surrounding the talks, timing, negotiating environment, outcome etc...have
been found as possible discriminator for the Ikle` categories (Druckman et al. (1999)).
The aim of the authors was to make comparisons between machine learning meth-
ods and the statistical ones applied in the past. The questions addressed was the
following:
• Which are the best predictive factors when the aim is to predict whether the
agreement is reached or not, and which are the ones that better predict the
type of agreement (partial, comprehensive, favoring one party or another party,
i.e. asymmetrical, equal benefits, i.e. symmetrical)?
• Are there features (the smallest subsets of 16) that strongly relate to the various
types of negotiation (Ikle` categories)?
The analysis is done on 42 cases, 30 originally used in 1999 and 12 added for this more
recent analysis15. Each one is categorized in the Ikle` categories and coded in terms
of the 16 features and of the 1 concerning the outcome of the negotiation attempt.
For these purposes decision trees and rule learning are utilized. A decision tree is
a hierarchical model that divides the sample space into smaller regions through the
choice of a discriminator attribute which becomes the root of the tree. The number
15I remand the reader to Druckman et al. (1999) for a complete description of cases and features.
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of the regions is given by the number of outcomes of the chosen discriminator. The
sub regions are then divided similarly as long as there are data to be split, that is,
until only leafs are found. The crucial step in building a decision tree is the choice
of an adequate attribute for splitting: one way of implementing the selection is to
use information gain, which is a method that enforces the convergence towards those
nodes where the majority of the examples belong to the same class. Once the tree
is built, the classification of new cases is done in the following way: the sample case
follow the branch of tree, starting from the root, that correspond to the outcome
of the test arriving to a new node with a new attribute. The procedure is repeated
until a leaf is reached, which predict the class for the sample. As said above, a
first analysis was to use a decision tree to learn descriptive discriminators between
the different types of negotiating objectives in the Ikle` typology. The quality of the
tree is computed not just evaluating the number of existing cases correctly classified,
because it could bring to an overfitting of the data, but through a leave-one-out-
cross-validation: of n experiments, n − 1 are used for training and the one left out
is used for testing, this is repeated n times, each time with a different example to
test. A first attempt brought to the construction of a decision tree with 24 leaf
nodes that classified correctly all the cases of the training set but that had a very
low percentage of predictive performance (39.02%). A second attempt contained 13
leaf nodes, classified 82.93% of the training set and 48.78% of the testing set. This
second tree has then been pruned16 and has been reduced to a tree with only 6 leaf
nodes (containing four of the Ikle` types, two repeated: the fifth category, extension,
is not used at all on the tree, probably because its characterization is too complex
with only 16 features).
16pruning is a post-processing method in which the tree is simplified replacing some interior nodes
of the tree with a new leaf removing the sub tree that was rooted on that node
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Figure 5.6: Decision Tree for Predicting Negotiation Types(Druckman et al. (2006))
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The tree is shown in figure 5.6, where each leaf contains the number of correct classi-
fications and the incorrect classification. For instance, the leaf “normalization (7/4)”
means that: the examples that derive from “relationship among parties=unfriendly
and delegation status= high” are 11(7+4) and 7 are correctly recognized as “nor-
malization” and 4 are incorrectly classified as other types.
Figure 5.7: Decision Tree for Predicting the type of outcome(Druckman et al. (2006))
This tree allow to look for those factors that characterize the negotiating outcome:
the first attribute is for example, relationship among parties, the second factor is
the delegation status and so on... The accuracy on the training set is of 70.73%
and the predictive accuracy is 53.03%. The second analysis regards the possibility of
making predictions on the outcome of the negotiation. The possible outcomes are:
symmetric cases (that among the dataset appears in 14 cases), asymmetric benefits
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(8), enlarged joint benefits (9), impasse (6) and mixed (5). The independent variables
are the ones previously used except the information on the outcome (because it is
the one to be predicted). The resulting tree is shown in fig. 5.7.
The accuracy for this tree is low, both for the training and the testing set: 54.76%
and 33.33%. The problem is given by the first attribute: a vast number of examples
have the property relationships among parties= NOT friendly, and among these
examples, 13 have as outcome symmetric benefits and are correctly recognized. The
tree cannot detect however other properties for discriminating the remaining 17 cases.
The node alone (which classifies 30 of 42 cases) brings an error rate of more than 50%.
It thus seems that decision tree is not the right method for predicting negotiating
outcome. The same procedure has been used also for predicting the agreement
reached: comprehensive, partial or no agreements. The resulting tree, better than
the previous ones, classify correctly 78% of the training set and up to 61.90% for the
testing set.
Also Trappl et al. (2006) utilize decision trees. They applied decision trees for pre-
dicting the outcome of a conflict management attempt. They have used the Confman
database (see section 5.3.1): 4570 conflict management attempts with 41 attributes.
The original decision tree obtained have 258 leaf while the pruned one 10 leaf nodes.
The pruned tree is shown in fig. 5.8.
The performance of the classification tree is done trough ten-fold-cross validation and
is 59.1%. The authors applied decision trees also for understanding if the year 1989 is
indeed critical, as theory suggests said, and if the variables used before 1989 have to
be taken into consideration also for models regarding data after 1989. The test have
been performed both on the Confman database and on International Crisis Behavior
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Figure 5.8: Decision Tree for Predicting success or failure of a conflict management
attempt.(Trappl et al. (2006))
(ICB) database17 and the results have confirmed that 1989 is indeed critical: the
structure of the two decision trees (before and after 1989) is quite different, and also
the main attribute, the root, is distinct in the two cases.
17http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/
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Rule Learning
The decision trees can be seen as a set of rules where each rule starts from the root
and end with a leaf. The rules have the form If condition then outcome. The rules
that can be extracted from a decision tree have always the same starting condition:
if the root attribute is “A”, then all the rules will appear as if (A= ...) and (other
conditions)... then outcome. This is a very rigid structure and it is due to the
fact that each example case is recognized by a unique path in the tree. If I relax
this constraint and allow overlap (one case covered by more than one rule) then it
is possible to find simpler rule. An example of a set of rules found by Druckman
et al. (2006) through the Ripper rule learning18 algorithm (Cohen (1995)) is given
below:
if number of parties = bilateral
then comprehensive(7/3)
if negotiation process = mixed
& number of issue = few
then partial(6/0)
if number of parties = large
& significant intra-party disagreement = symmetrical
then partial(5/0)
if time pressure = no time limit
then partial(5/1)
if relationship among the parties = unfriendly
18http://www.cs.cmu.edu/ wcohen/
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& time pressure = firm deadline
then no agreement (7/9)
else comprehensive(7/9)
The last rule of this set tells that if there is an unfriendly relationships between the
parties and if there is a firm deadline then the negotiation process would be a failure.
As in the decision tree approach, at the end of the learning a pruning on the rules
can be done19.
19Rule learning is used for building a global model for all the data, the authors apply also
Association Rules to look for local pattern describing relations that hold only for part of the data.
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Chapter 6
Risk Assessment through Logic
Function
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we will look at the application of an existing learning method to
the risk assessment problem. The method is based on Logic functions, in which
logic separation formulas are extrapolated in an automatic way from logic data. It
allows to make classification and it also provides new insights on the data, like the
identification of the variables that are really interesting for controlling a country
at risk, or for verifying some theoretical assumptions. As already said, the domain
considered is the logic one: the data need to be in the form of vectors of boolean
extended variables (1,0,-1). Some notations and preliminary definitions are shown in
Appendix A.
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6.2 Logic Data and Logic Separation
Suppose we have a list of country to be observed according to some n control vari-
ables. Suppose that associated to each country/vector there is a property (outcome)
with value True or False: for instance, the presence or not of a risk of conflict (the
outcome will be denoted by the boolean variable t). If the control variables have
True/False/0 values, then the vectors related to each country are called records of
logic data. A 1 in a record means that a certain Boolean variable has value True, and
a −1 that the variable has value False. The value 0 is used when the True/False value
of the variable is not known. Records for which the outcome is t=1 are collected in
a set A, and those for which t=0 in a set B. For ease of recognition, I usually denote
a member of A by a, and of B by b. For instance:
A: set for which t = 1 => {(1,1,1), (1,0,1), (1,-1,1)}
B: set for which t = 0 => {(1,0,-1), (1,-1,-1), (1,1,-1)}
Here we have 6 records of logic data (6 countries), each one composed of three logic
variables (which describe some characteristics of each country like presence/absence
of democracy, respect/no respect of civil liberties etc...). Suppose that the records
have been put in the set A or B due to a prior knowledge on the value of the out-
come t: for example, the third record a in A may result from seeing a country at
risk which has the True value for the first and the third criteria and False for the
second. The interest is in classifying new records in the correct class (set A or B)
when the outcome is unknown so that we can predict the risk of a country looking
at its associated logic variables.
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This can be done deducing {0, +/-1} s vectors that may be used to compute for each
record the associated outcome: they separate the records with outcome True (in A)
from the records with outcome False (in B). These vectors are called separating
vectors. A separating set is a collection of separating vectors.
For the example above, lets consider the first vector a = (1, 1, 1) of A: the vector
s = (0, 0, 1) is a separating vector that separates a from all b ∈ B, in fact all the
records in b has the third component not equal to 1.
The separation of A and B makes sense only when both A and B are not empty,
and when each record of A or B contains at least one {+/-1} entry. A non trivial
conditions for separation to be possible have also to be stated. Consider two records
of logic data, say g and f . I say that f is nested in g if for any entry fi of f equal
to +1 or −1, the corresponding entry gi of g satisfies gi = fi. It can then be proved
the following:
Theorem 1 Let A and B be sets of {0, +/-1} records of the same length. Then a
separating set S exists if and only if no record a ∈ A is nested in any record b ∈ B.
From the above theorem I can say that a {0, +/-1} vector s separates a record a ∈ A
from B if:
s is not nested in any b ∈ B (6.1)
s is nested in a (6.2)
A separating set S separates B from A if, for each a ∈ A, there exists a separating
vector s ∈ S that separates a from B.
154 CHAPTER 6. RISK ASSESSMENT THROUGH LOGIC FUNCTION
In the example, the vector s = (0, 0, 1) is indeed a separating vector that separates
a from all the b ∈ B, since, it is nested in a ( s3 = 1 = a3) and it is not nested in
any of the b (the only non zero entry in s is s3 = 1 and for all b, b3 = −1). It is
important to note that the separating set S that separates B from A (S(B,A)) is
different from the one that separates A from B (S(A,B)): this follows from theorem
1 which holds for a separation S(A,B), but that can be applied to the separation
S(B,A): no identical separating vectors can be part of the separating sets S(A,B)
and at the same time S(B,A) due to the nestedness conditions.
6.3 The Lsquare system
Lsquare is freely distributed and has been developed in collaboration between the
Istituto di Analisi dei Sistemi ed Informatica of Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche
(IASI-CNR) and the University of Texas and is described in detail in Felici et al.
(2004), and Truemper (2004). Lsquare (Truemper, 1999) is a machine learning algo-
rithm that builds logic formulas (classification rules) to express separations amongst
groups of data, A and B.
The logic formulas, which are the results of two minimum cost satisfiability problems
(MINSAT problems)1, are in Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF). They are composed
of conjunctive clauses, each one covering part of the training set: some of the clauses
(few) with large coverage (the interpretation of the trends present in the data) and
1The MINSAT problems belong to the class of NP-complete problems. Here they are solved
by the Leibniz system, a logic programming system based on decomposition and combinatorial
optimization results which has been developed at the University of Texas at Dallas (see Truemper
(1996) for detail).
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others (several) with smaller coverage (the interpretation of the outliers in the train-
ing set).
The logic formulas extracted are of two types: with minimum support and with
maximum support. A separating formulas with minimum support uses the minimum
number of logic variables, that is, the minimum amount of information contained in
the data to separate the sets. On the opposite, a separating formulas with maximum
support uses maximum amount of information to define the separating sets. Lsquare
extracts four logic formulas: the first two separate, B from A, respectively, with the
minimum number of logic variables (minimum support) (SMIN(B,A)) and with the
maximum number of logic variables (maximum support) (SMAX(B,A)), while the
other two separate A from B, with minimum (SMIN(A,B)) and maximum support
(SMAX(A,B)). An example of a formula is:
Formula 3 A, 10, min (True means vote for A)
clause size literals
1 2 Var1 Var4
2 3 Var2 Var3 Var5
3 7 ...
...
10 4 ...
This is the formula number 3, it separates A from B and it is composed of the
minimum number of variables, SMIN(A,B): there are ten clauses, the first clause is
composed of two logic variables, the second one of three logic variables, the third of
7 logic variables...etc
In logic notation: [ Var1 & Var4 ] | [ Var2 & Var3 & Var5] | [...]...
If one of the ten clasues is verified for a certain record r, then the formula assumes
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the True value and the record r is assigned to the class A.
The difference between minimum and maximum support has a strong connection
with the quality of the separations and with the error that will be made by the sep-
arating vectors on non classified records, as discussed in Felici and Truemper (1999)
and Felici et al. (1999). Consider the training sets A and B as subsets of more gen-
eral sets A and B, and the testing sets as the union of the sets A and B. Once that
the separating set S is constructed, it is possible to check if a certain vector {0,±1}
r belongs to A or to B. In the case that a record of A-A is classified as belonging to
B I talk about type A error (that correspond to FP as defined in section 5.1, false
positives) otherwise if a record of B-B is classified as belonging to A the error is a
type B error (that correspond to FC, false negatives). In some situations an error
of one type can bring no problems while in other cases can be very dangerous, for
instance in a medical diagnosis for cancer, a benign case that is classified as malign
(type B error) triggers additional tests and it is thus of no great relevance, while a
malign case classified as benign(type A error) is very dangerous. Our interest, in
conflict situation, is to minimize the type A error that is the error classification of
type FP (false positive). For this reason, it is the formula SMIN(A,B) which has the
main attraction.
In order to evaluate the accuracy of the classification method, both the accuracy
(sensitivity) and efficiency through Bayes theorem for the logic formulas obtained
with Lsquare are calculated. The formulas are applied to the records of the testing
set, whose belonging group (A or B) is known apriori. The system can then deduce
how many records of A or of B are correctly classified. For each formula two accuracy
percentage are obtained, one for the group A and one for B.
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6.4 Conflict analysis via logic functions
The promising results that Logic Functions have obtained in several fields have given
rise to an interest in a possible application to conflict analysis. The capability of not
only classifying records but also of allowing a posterior analysis of the classification
rules seems to be an important point in the conflict field. After presenting the dataset
and some results of an application of Lsquare, I will try to point out some advantages
and drawbacks of this application.
6.4.1 MID analysis with Lsquare: transformation and use of
the data
The primary data I have utilized can be obtained from Russett and Oneal (2001a).
The dataset consists of information on the characteristics of countries and their
interactions with all other countries over time. It is organized by pairs of countries
(the dyadic interstate behavior is considered), on the principle that countries don’t
fight everyone at once, but fight with particular other countries with which they have
grievances, or which present opportunities for aggrandizement, and with which it has
an opportunity to fight and at least some perceived chances of success. The original
dataset contains 39,996 entries, 16 variables and covers the period 1885-1992. I will
consider the same variables but I will reduce the dataset to 27,646 entries covering
just the period 1950-1992. The variables are the following:
• statea and stateb are the COW2 Code for state a and state b,
2The Correlates of War Project was founded in 1963 by J. David Singer, a political scientist at
the University of Michigan. The original and continuing goal of the project has been the systematic
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• year is the year (between 1950 and 1992),
• dependa and dependb3, created by Gleditsch (2002), are the bilateral trade to
GDP ratio of the state a and of the state b. They are continuous variables
measuring the level of economic interdependence of one state in the dyad and
they are obtained dividing the sum of a country’s exports and imports with its
partner by its GDP,
• demauta and demautb are a summary measure of the political character of
regimes for state a and state b taken from the Polity III data (Jaggers and
Gurr, 1996), they are obtained subtracting from each country’s score on the
democracy scale its score on the autocracy scale, they are measured on a 21
scale where 10 is the highest value and -10 is the lowest value and they represent
the degree of democratization in both the states in the dyads,
• allies, taken from Rengger and Campbell (1995), is a binary variable which is
equal to 1 if the members of a dyad are linked by a mutual defense treaty or
neutrality pact, while it is equal to 0 otherwise,
• dispute is our output, that is the MID, which represents the non accidental
threat to use military force or a display of military force between states. The
value of the output is 1 if a militarized interstate dispute begins and 0 oth-
erwise. In this analysis I will take into account only the initial year of the
accumulation of scientific knowledge about war and has assembled information regarding militarized
interstate disputes, 1816-1992. See http://www.correlatesofwar.org
3In section 5.3.1 Lagazio and Russett (2003) take only one of the two variable dependa and
dependb: they consider the less value between the two thus taking the less dependent state in the
dyad. The same is done by Marwala et al. (2006). Also demauta and demautb are used in both
cases as one variable that describe the state with the less value of democracy.
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militarized conflict, since the objective of the model is to predict the onset of
a conflict rather than its continuation, our intention is however to try in the
future to enrich the model with the use of event data in order to deeply study
the dynamics and the continuation of the conflict.
• logdstab is the natural logarithm of the great circle distance in miles between
the two states capitals,
• lcaprat is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the stronger state’s military
capability index to that of the weaker member. It is taken from the COW
project’s data and it emphasizes the importance of the balance of power in
interstate relations,
• smigoabi describes the influence of international organizations on interstate
conflict by counting the number of intergovernmental organizations, as reported
in the Yearbook of International Organizations4, in which both states in a dyad
share membership,
• opena and openb are variables representing the standard measure of economic
openness which is equals to the total trade of country a(b) divided for its GDP,
• minrpwrs is coded 0 if a dyad is composed of minor powers and -1 for pairs
that include at least one major power. The major powers have been identified
by the COW project based on the consensus of historians,
• noncontg is a binary variable which equals 0 if two states are not directly or
indirectly contiguous (via colonies or other dependencies), and -1 if they share
a land border or are separated by less than 150 miles of water.
4see: https://www.diversitas.org/db/x.php?DD=OR
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It is important to note that the variables are not all binary variables, so the ap-
plication of a method based on Logic Function requires a further step. Rational
data have to be transformed in logic data. Lsquare include an automatic method to
map continuous variables into binary ones (for a complete description see Truemper
(2004)). The idea behind the transformation is to divide the range of the single
rational variables into a number of intervals inserting some cutpoint. Each interval is
then associated with a logic variable that has the value 1 if the observation belongs
to the interval and 0 otherwise. For instance, consider the variable demauta which is
a numerical variable with values from -10 to +10, I can impose two cutpoints at value
-5 and +5 so that the unique variable is split into three logic variables, demauta1,
demauta2, demauta3, each one covering an interval, [−10,−5), [−5, 5), [5, 10].
The whole dataset has been divided in training set and testing set where the complete
data set is A∪B, the training set is A∪B and the testing set is A−A∪B−B.
6.5 Results
In this section I present the results of some experiments that were run on our dataset.
Below I recall the meaning of the different separating sets for which results will be
reported:
SMIN(B,A) = min support, separates B from A;
SMAX(B,A) = max support, separates B from A;
SMIN(A,B) = min support, separates A from B;
SMAX(A,B) = max support, separates A from B;
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What I would desire to obtain is a good efficiency in classifying A cases in order to
discover those critical patterns useful to prevent and predict conflict situations. As I
have seen in the previous sections, logic functions method required that the dataset
is composed of records with certain properties in order to have separable data (see
theorem 1 in section 6.2). The dataset I have used is composed of an high number of
records with unknown values for certain variables that risk to be considered as equal
by Lsquare once that the transformation from rational data to logic data is done.
Lsquare ignores, before beginning the construction of logic formulas, those records
that avoid a complete separation thus diminishing the accuracy of the prediction (the
records discharged are not recognizable from the model). I have done experiments
with the complete dataset and also discharging these records (reduced dataset). In
the following I will take into consideration the reduced dataset that contains 24605
entries.
In the table below I report the percentage for correct recognition of records A − A
and B − B and Total = A− A ∪ B − B.
Table 6.1:
Percent Correct
Separation A− A B − B Total
SMIN(B,A) 0.529 0.833 0.832
SMAX(B,A) 0.597 0.761 0.760
SMIN(A,B) 0.622 0.784 0.783
SMAX(A,B) 0.504 0.857 0.855
Overall 0.529 0.784 0.782
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These results are obtained for a training set of 200 records of A-cases (conflict) and
400 records for B-cases (no conflict) and a testing set of 412 A-cases and 23570
B-cases.
The better results is given by the third entry of the table which is related to the
formula that separate A from B and that recognize 62.2% conflict cases and 78.4%
peace cases: it is indeed the information I am interested in since it allows to minimize
the error classification of type FP (false positive). In table 6.2 I consider various run
varying the size of the training sets and I report the results only for the formula
number three.
Table 6.2:
SMIN(A,B) Percent Correct
size A - B A− A B − B Total
100 - 50 0.741 0.512 0.518
100 - 100 0.7 0.6 0.601
200 - 400 0.622 0.784 0.783
300 - 150 0.735 0.65 0.65
500 - 150 0.747 0.52 0.63
It is interesting to note that, while a relative high classification is reached for the set
A, the peace cases (B), apart from the case 200-400, are correctly classified at the
best with a percentage of 65%. Given that the majority of the records in whatever
dataset of conflict data is about peace situation, this is a result that can give rise
to doubts about classification through the model I have built: in fact, almost all
the models have problems in classifying conflict cases while no problem arise for the
peace ones. It is important to remark that there is a sort of incompatibility between
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an high accuracy and efficiency. if I use a trivial algorithm that classify all cases in
the peace class it would obtain an efficiency of 15 while the algorithm that assigns
all the cases to the war class would reach an accuracy of 1. There is thus no surprise
that when choosing of maximizing the performance on A classification, the relative
B classification have a decrease: a tradeoff is needed.
It is interesting the comparison of the apriori probability: with 612 records of conflict
situation and 23993 records of peace situation, the probability of having a conflict
is 2.4%. When applying Bayes, the probability that a record is a conflict one given
the fact that the model has classified that record in the conflict class is of 7%.
6.6 Conclusions
The method I have described is an existing and well tested method with successfull
applications in several fields, economic and medical among others. It is too early to
conclude that its application to the conflict analysis can bring positive and practical
results. The reasons are several: first of all, a better dataset is fundamental, not only
we have to decide whether to study dyads or countries, but we have also to improve
the kind of information to be analyzed. We have to make some apriori analysis on
the choice of the variables. As an example, in the last years a growing attention has
been brought to the role of environmental factors in causing crises and conflicts, and
in their unfolding and solution. The inclusion in the risk assessment models of such
data might be crucial to improve their predictive capacity. Unfortunately, according
5Neural networks used by King and Zeng in section 5.3.1 classify correctly with an accuracy of
more than 99% the peace cases, while classify badly more than 83% of war cases (only 16.4% of
war cases are classified as being war). And the efficiency reaches a value higher than 50%.
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to our knowledge, there are no easily available datasets on these factors. One of
the problem I have found is that, during the transformation from rational to logic
variables, few intervals are used and very different results are obtained according to
the way the intervals are determined. Second, I believe that the benefit of an analysis
in which the classification is just yes/no is of limited interest for political purposes.
The great quantity of useful information that we can extract from the logic formulas
should be accompanied by a better classification. Instead of looking for “conflict/no
conflict situations”, we would like to enrich our model with an increased number of
classes regarding the type of risk (low, medium, high...). The problem in this case
is again the augmented complexity of the resolution algorithm because with more
classes, several new logic variables should be inserted during the transformation from
rational to logic data.
One of the advantages of this method is also that the output, the logic classification
formulas, can be used for finding new insights on the data and for verifying some
theoretical assumption. In comparison to the neural network, Logic Formulas cannot
be considered as a black box : the information stored in a neural network is a set of
numerical weights and connections that provides no direct evidence as to how the task
is performed or what the relationship is between inputs and outputs. Instead, the
formula extracted by Lsquare are composed of a great number of clauses (sometimes
more than 80) but each clause has limited size6. For instance, an example of a
clause of a Lsquare separating formula that recognize A with min support is the
following:
IF (intergovernmental organizations < Sa)
AND (the level of economic interdependence between the two countries > Sb)
6Each formula is a DNF, so if one clause is verified, then the formula takes the value True.
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AND (level of democracy < Sc)
AND (economic trade openess > Sd)
THEN (high probability of conflict)
Where Sb, Sc, Sd are cutpoints inserted in the transformation phase from rational to
logic. If in the dataset I find a record for which a combination of variables satisfies
this clause, then the record is classified as describing a situation of conflict, otherwise
(if the others clauses of the formula are not satisfied either) of no conflict. So if the
number of intergovernmental organizations is low (according to the cutpoint inserted
by the method or manually by us), if there is an high interdependence between the
two country of the dyad and at the same time a low level of democracy for at least one
of the countries, even if there is a good trade openess, there is a high possibility that
the two countries engage a military conflict. An analysis of these formulas can also
be used for verifying conflict theory. For example, the clause I have just described
include the three pillars of the so called Kantian Peace, a theory taken from the
essay of Immanuel Kant of 1775: the Perpetual Peace (Kant (1927)). In this essay
Kant suggested that international peace could be established on a foundation of
three elements: republican constitutions, “cosmopolitan law” embodied in free trade
and economic interdependence, and international law and organizations. A deep
study can be done for extracting useful and interesting new consideration also on
the theoretical aspects of the conflicts. In this part of analysis it is important to
consider the way in which conflicts are developing in the last years. For instance,
the greater importance that environmental aspects are having in some crisis can be
utilized, building some new indicators, for better understanding and finding new
relations with critical variables, maybe already present in the well known conflict
theory.
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General Conclusion
Giving the increased importance in the last decades in security related problems, I
have done a systematic study of quantitative methods for conflict analysis and pre-
vention. I have analyzed both existing methods and methods never used before. The
main objective was to underline the characteristics of each technique, its potential-
ities and limits. One of the crucial point in conflict analysis is the use of data. For
describing a conflict and its dynamics is in fact necessary to have a dataset that keep
track of the trend of the situation daily or weekly (dynamic data), but the same
time it is important to know which is the storic, social, economic context in which a
country is inserted (structural data). In the literature there are some methods that
use only structural data and that individuate causal relations among them, others
that use only dynamic data and that are based on the monitoring of the events
that occur daily. In the last years several models have begun to use both, mixing
structural and dynamic factors. The first step of my analysis was to focus on the
main problems that the community should consider for concrete political purposes
in order to understand which are the methods to be used. Since a conflict can be
seen as complex dynamic system, the first question I have studied was: which are
the main factors affecting the dynamics of a conflict and how can we study their
evolution? This questions can be addressed with methods that use structural data
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and that find casual relation among them and with methods that uses dynamic data
with the intention of making prediction in the short term. Among the methods of
the first type (causal models), one the most interesting application is given by the
simulation, in particular the system dynamics which is a methodology for studying
complex system with the aid of computer simulation. In this thesis I have presented
some existing models. The majority of them need still to be improved but I think
that system dynamics can indeed be an useful instrument in conflict analysis: one
of the crucial point to remind is in fact that in complex situations minimal actions
can create unthinkable behaviors and the concept of feedback loops seems thus ap-
propriate. The other models that study the dynamics of a conflict have the aim of
making short term prediction and they are based on the concept of conflict phases:
a conflict can in fact be seen as a sequence of phases that form a cycle, and knowing
the characterization of these cycles we may try to make predictions on the ongoing
conflicts. In this context I have presented two existing models based on Hidden
Markov Chains and Clustering. I have also given a new contribution proposing the
use of the Clustering Multicritera to the place of single Clustering. According to my
knowledge, it has never been used before in the field. In particular, I have adapted
an existing algorithm which has been implemented and tested in the economic field.
The experimentation, which has given results of a certain interest, has been made
on real data concerning the Nepal situation.
The second question I have addressed in the thesis was about the evaluation of the
risks of countries (risk assessment): how could we learn the characteristics of coun-
tries at risk so that to prevent future crisis and suggest political actions?
I have explored different techniques, in particular those based on neural networks and
on learning logic system. Neural networks are one of the methods mainly used in the
conflict fields because they can handle with the high nonlinearities that characterize
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a conflict. Their black box approach, however, is a great limit in a field in which
a posterior analysis of the results is needed. For this reason I have proposed a new
contribution: I have applied an existing method based on logic functions (a learning
system that work with logic variables), never used before for conflict analysis. I
have tested the method on a real dataset composed of structural information and I
have demonstrated that the results are comparable, and in some cases better, with
neural networks and that it allows a important posterior analysis because the logic
formulas are boolean formulas composed of a limited number of clauses easy to be
studied.
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Appendix A
Logic Data
A.1 Preliminary Definitions
In this section I will introduce the main concepts of propositional logic1. A Boolean
variable (or logic variable) is a variable that can assume only the value True/False.
A Boolean formula is a connection of logic variables and logic operators such as the
“not” operator ¬, the “and” operator ∧, and the “or” operator ∨. The Boolean
formulas can assume the True value or the False value based on the values assigned
to the variables. A Boolean formula where boolean variables, possibly negated, are
joined by the operator ∧ (resp. ∨) is called a conjunction (resp. disjunction). A
Boolean formula S is satisfied if there exists a combination of its variables so that the
value of the formula is True. A conjunctive normal form system (CNF) is a Boolean
formula where some disjunctions are joined with the operator ∧. Each disjunction
of a CNF system is called a CNF clause. A disjunctive normal form system (DNF),
1See Truemper (1998) for a complete presentation.
172 APPENDIX A. LOGIC DATA
is a Boolean formula where some conjunctions are joined with the operator ∨. Each
conjunction of a DNF system is called a DNF clause. The satisfiability problem
(SAT) is the problem of deciding whether a CNF formula is satisfiable and, in the
affermative case, the problem of finding the association of True/False values for the
logic variables to make the formula satisfied. If I associate a non negative cost to the
True value of each logic variable, I can define the minimum cost satisfiability problem
(MINSAT) as the problem of solving the SAT problem with minimum sum of costs
for the variables with value True.
Appendix B
Event Data
Dynamics methods are used for analyzing the dynamic aspects of the processes. They
have been completely accepted by the political science community only in the last
decade because the core of these methods is the use of machine-coded data whose
credibility only recently has increased with the use of high-capacity computers. The
data coded are called Event Data and describe the interactions between international
actors as reported in the open press and represent the events which are happening
in the region under study and which provide relevant information on the conflicts in
that region. In general such event data should be collected and updated on a weekly
or daily basis so to be able to perform an effective monitoring of the conflicts.
The sources from which the news are extracted can be of different type, global or
local, depending on the situation we want to describe. Reuter News Service is one
of the international sources more used.
In order to create event data from some sources, an automated coding system is
used.
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Usually the event data are created from lead sentences, that are simple and declar-
ative sentences summarizing the article considered. These are then transformed in
machine-readable text and used as input for programs that parse them fully or par-
tially depending on the computational method used. Systems that use fully parsing
try to decipher a sentence fully while those that use sparse parsing determine only
the parts of the sentence necessary for the coding, like political actors or interesting
action verbs etc... For example, consider the following sentence :“ The World Bank
on Thursday approved a 90 million dollar loan to help Egypt improve the health of its
citizens, improve the efficiency and quality of health care services, and ensure equal
access for all groups.” (Schrodt and Gerner (2000)). The machine that use a sparse
parsing will extract the key components of the sentence:
• the subject : The World Bank
• the verb: approved
• the direct object: 90 million dollar loan
• the indirect object: Egypt
Once these parts are extracted, the system accesses dictionaries containing large set
of verb patterns for doing the match and determining the appropriate coding. The
most common event data sets used for international relations are COPDAB (Azar
(1982)), WEIS (McClelland (1976)), and IDEA1.
In the above example using WEIS, the verb approved with the direct object ..loan
would be matched with WEIS code 0712.
An example of a sparse parser is KEDS3 Schrodt et al. (1994), developed in 1994,
1http://vranet.com/IDEA/
2See Appendix C for the detailed structure of WEIS
3http://www.ku.edu/ keds
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which has been successfully used for a thorough coverage of political events in the
Middle East and the Balkans and also for regions usually not well reported, such
as West Africa. Another more recent (2000) automated coding system is TABARI
(Textual Analysis By Augmented Replacement Instructions)4, which can use the
dictionaries developed for KEDS because it is based on the same parsing princi-
ple, and is more flexible and faster. It can reduce the time of recoding a data set
from hours to minutes or seconds, being about 70 times faster than KEDS. More-
over KEDS is written in Pascal and works only on Macintosh operating systems
while TABARI, written in ANSI C++, is available for Linux, Macintosh and Win-
dows operating systems. Using this technology, about two dozen regional event data
sets, primarily focusing on areas experiencing protracted conflict, have been pro-
duced (http://www.ku.edu/ keds/data.html). Another automated coding system,
the VRA Reader (http://vranet.com/productsRead.html), has been developed by
the consulting firm Virtual Research Associates (VRA; http://vranet.com). It is a
system which is based on full parsing, a very different natural language processing
approach than that used in KEDS and TABARI. VRA has produced data for a
number of government and NGO clients, and has released a global event data set
available at http://gking.harvard.edu/data.shtml containing about 10-million events
based on Reuters reports from 1990 to 2004: FAST project uses event data coded
by VRA.
As shown in figure B.1 the structure of one event-data allowed us to know the type
of event, the initiator, the recipient, the gravity of the event and many other char-
acteristics.
4http://www.ku.edu/ keds/tabari.html
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Figure B.1: An example of two event-data as they appear in the FAST data-base.
Appendix C
WEIS Structure and IDEA scale
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World Event Interaction Survey Events (WEIS)
Cue Code Secondary Code Goldstein scale value
01 YIELD
011 Surrender, yield to order, submit to arrest, etc. 0.6
012 Yield position; arrest; evacuate 0.6
013 Admit wrongdoing; retract statement 2.0
02 COMMENT
021 Explicit decline to comment -0.1
022 Comment on situation-pessimistic -0.4
023 Comment on situation-neutral -0.2
024 Comment on situation-optimistic 0.4
025 Explain policy or future position 0.0
03 CONSULT
031 Meet with; at neutral site; or send note 1.0
032 Visit; go to 1.9
033 Receive visit; host 2.8
04 APPROVE
041 Praise, hail, applaud, condolences 3.4
042 Endorse others policy or position give verbal support 3.6
05 PROMISE
051 Promise own policy support 4.5
052 Promise material support 5.2
053 Promise other future support action 4.5
054 Assure; reassure 2.8
06 GRANT
061 Express regret; apologize 1.8
062 Give state invitation 2.5
063 Grant asylum -1.1
064 Grant privilege, diplomatic recognition; de facto relations, etc 5.4
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Cue Code Secondary Code Goldstein scale value
065 Suspend negative sanctions; truce 2.9
066 Release and/or return persons or property 1.9
07 REWARD
071 Extend economic aid (for gift and/or loan) 7.4
072 Extend military assistance 8.3
073 Give other assistance 6.5
08 AGREE
081 Make substantive agreement 6.5
082 Agree to future action or procedure, agree to meet, to negotiate 3.0
09 REQUEST
091 Ask for information 0.1
092 Ask for policy assistance 3.4
093 Ask for material assistance 3.4
094 Request action; call for -0.1
095 Entreat; plead; appeal to; help me 1.2
10 PROPOSE
101 Offer proposal 1.5
102 Urge or suggest action or policy -0.1
11 REJECT
111 Turn down proposal; reject protest, threat, etc. -4.0
112 Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow -4.0
12 ACCUSE
121 Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove -2.2
122 Denounce; denigrate; abuse -3.4
13 PROTEST
131 Make complaint (not formal) -1.9
132 Make formal complaint or or protest -2.4
14 DENY
141 Deny an accusation -0.9
180 APPENDIX C. WEIS STRUCTURE AND IDEA SCALE
Cue Code Secondary Code Goldstein scale value
142 Deny an attributed policy, action, or position -1.1
15 DEMAND
151 Issue order or command, insist; demand compliance, etc -4.0
16 WARN
161 Give warning -3.0
17 THREATEN
171 Threat without specific negative sanctions -4.4
172 Threat with specific nonmilitary sanctions -5.8
173 Threat with force specified -7.0
174 Ultimatum; threat with negative sanctions and time limit specified -6.9
18 DEMONSTRATE
181 Nonmilitary demonstration; walk-out on -5.2
182 Armed force mobilization, exercise and/or display -7.6
19 REDUCE RELATIONSHIP (as negative sanctions)
191 Cancel or postpone planned event -2.2
192 Reduce routine international activity -4.1
193 Reduce or cut off aid or assistance -5.6
194 Halt negotiations -3.8
195 Break diplomatic relations -7.0
20 EXPEL
201 Order personnel out of country -5.0
202 Expel organization or group -4.9
21 SEIZE
211 Seize position or possessions -9.2
212 Detain or arrest person(s) -4.4
22 FORCE
221 Noninjury destructive act -8.3
222 Nonmilitary injury-destruction -8.7
223 Military engagement -10.0
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An example
(see http:\\journalism.berkeley.edu/conf/mediaatwar/prez/schrodt conflict.ppt)
The following sentences have been extracted from Reuters in 1990 and they regards the
Iraq-Kuwait Crisis:
July 17, 1990 : RESURGENT IRAQ SENDS SHOCK WAVES THROUGH GULF ARAB
STATES
Iraq President Saddam Hussein launched an attack on Kuwait and the United Arab Emi-
rates (UAE) Tuesday, charging they had conspired with the United States to depress world
oil prices through overproduction.
July 23, 1990 : IRAQ STEPS UP GULF CRISIS WITH ATTACK ON KUWAITI MIN-
ISTER
Iraqi newspapers denounced Kuwait’s foreign minister as a U.S. agent Monday, pouring oil
on the flames of a Persian Gulf crisis Arab leaders are struggling to stifle with a flurry of
diplomacy.
July 24, 1990 : IRAQ WANTS GULF ARAB AID DONORS TO WRITE OFF WAR
CREDITS
Debt-burdened Iraq’s conflict with Kuwait is partly aimed at persuading Gulf Arab cred-
itors to write off billions of dollars lent during the war with Iran, Gulf-based bankers and
diplomats said.
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WEIS Coding of 1990 Iraq-Kuwait Crisis
Date Source Target Code Type of action
900717 IRQ KUW 121 CHARGE
900723 IRQ KUW 122 DENOUNCE
900724 IRQ ARB 150 DEMAND
900724 IRQ OPC 150 DEMAND
900725 IRQ EGY 054 ASSURE
900727 IRQ KUW 160 WARN
900731 IRQ KUW 182 MOBILIZATION
900801 KUW IRQ 112 REFUSE
900802 IRQ KUW 223 MILITARY FORCE
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The IDEA scale1 is an extension of the well known Goldstein scale that assigns to each
event category a value ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). In
the table below are shown the IDEA values for some of the WEIS events.
1http://vranet.com/IDEA/
http://vranet.com/IDEA/coderhelp/testcoderhelp.htm.
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IDEA Scale for WEIS Events
223: [-10] Military attack; clash; assault
211: [-9.2] Seize position or possessions
222: [-8.7] Nonmilitary destruction/injury
182: [-8.3] Noninjury destructive action
195: [-7.6] Armed force mobilization, exercise, display; military buildup
173: [-7.0] Break diplomatic relations
174: [-7.0] Threat with force specified
172: [-6.9] Ultimatum; threat with negative sanction and time limit
193: [-5.8] Threat with specific negative nonmilitary sanction
181: [-5.6] Reduce or cut off aid or assistance; act to punish/deprive
201: [-5.2] Nonmilitary demonstration, walk out on
202: [-5.0] Order person or personnel out of country
150: [-4.9] Expel organization or group
171: [-4.9] Issue order or command, insist, demand compliance
212: [-4.4] Threat without specific negative sanction stated
192: [-4.4] Detain or arrest person(s)
112: [-4.1] Reduce routine international activity; recall officials
111: [-4.0] Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow
194: [-4.0] Turn down proposal; reject protest, demand, threat
122: [-3.8] Halt negotiation
160: [-3.4] Denounce; denigrate; abuse
132: [-3.0] Give warning
121: [-2.4] Issue formal complaint or protest
191: [-2.2] Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove
131: [-2.2] Cancel or postpone planned event
063: [-1.9] Make complaint (not formal)
142: [-1.1] Grant asylum
141: [-0-9] Deny an attributed policy, action, role or position
... ....
073: [6.5] Give other assistance
081: [6.5] Make substantive agreement
071 [7.4] Extend economic aid; give, buy, sell, loan, borrow
072: [8.3] Extend military assistance
Appendix D
System Dynamics basics
System Dynamics is a methodology for analyzing complex systems and problems over
time with the aid of computer simulation software. It helps us better understand
the causes of some behavior, whether social, technological, or both. If the behavior
under study is undesirable, system dynamics can also be used to find ways to improve
that behavior. Changes in the system of analysis are caused by the influence of a
system’s states on the actions that change those states.
The states and actions within a system are variables that are represented through
the use of the terms stocks and flows (or, alternatively, levels and rates).
The term feedback loop is used for situations in which a state causes an action that
influences the initial state, either directly, or through intervening states and ac-
tions.
Complex systems could be represented in system dynamics stock/flow diagrams sim-
ilar to figure D.1. In the stock/flow diagrams the variables are connected using arcs
which can form feedback loops: changes in the system occur when the levels of the
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Figure D.1: A system dynamics model (section D.1)
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Figure D.2: An example of feedback negative loop
stocks (the system states, in the boxes) create changes in the flows (the valves, repre-
sented by valve symbols and double-lined pipes), which then act to change the stocks
and so on... In figure D.2 it is shown a negative reinforcement. Rebellion growth can
not continue forever, because as more and more people rebel, there increase the Re-
pression of Government that bring to a fewer International Support for ethnic group
and thus to a fewer Capacity for Rebellion. Mathematically, a system dynamics
model is equivalent to a set of (algebraic, differential and integral) equations, whose
solutions describe the time evolution of the system.
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